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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Regulation and Entrepreneurship 
by 
Marek Zapletal 
 
Chair: Francine Lafontaine 
This dissertation analyzes how government regulations can affect entrepreneurship and small 
business performance. The first essay focuses on the effects of occupational licensing regulation, 
which has increased dramatically in importance over the last several decades and currently 
affects more than one thousand occupations in the United States. I use confidential U.S. Census 
Bureau micro-data to study the relationships between occupational licensing and key business 
outcomes. Among findings that shed light on the effect of occupational licensing on 
entrepreneurship are that occupational licensing regulation does not affect the equilibrium 
number of practitioners, but substantially reduces their entry and exit rates and that providers of 
occupational licensing training, namely, schools, are larger and seem to be more profitable in 
states with more stringent occupational licensing regulation. In the second essay, I explore (with 
a coauthor) whether businesses started as franchises survive longer than those launched as 
independent businesses, and whether there is a relationship between state franchise relationship 
xii 
 
regulation aimed at preventing franchisor opportunism and the survival of franchised businesses. 
We find the difference in one-year survival rate between franchised and independent businesses 
to be about five percentage points, and this gap to persist across two and three-year survival 
rates. State franchise relationship laws, however, do not seem to affect the survival of franchised 
businesses. In the final essay, I analyze (with a coauthor) how personal bankruptcy laws affect 
entrepreneurship. Lenient bankruptcy laws may encourage entrepreneurship by limiting the 
possible negative consequences of business failure. We examine this relationship using variation 
in state bankruptcy homestead exemptions, and analyze the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 that affected these exemptions. We argue that 
sole proprietorships are expected to be affected by the differences in homestead exemptions, 
corporations, because they have limited liability, not to be affected. Consistent with these 
predictions, entrepreneurs’ choice of legal form of organization does not seem to be affected by 
homestead exemptions, and we find no evidence of any significant effect of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act on entry rates. 
. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: EVIDENCE FROM 
DETAILED BUSINESS-LEVEL DATA 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Occupational licensing regulation specifies requirements a practitioner must fulfill to be 
permitted to perform certain services. Such regulation currently governs, to varying degrees 
across U.S. states, more than one thousand occupations (Brinegar, 2006), and both the number of 
occupations and percentage of the workforce covered by such regulations have increased 
dramatically over the last several decades. At present, nearly thirty percent of the workforce is 
required to obtain some form of licensing, up from about four percent in the 1950s (Kleiner and 
Krueger, 2013). These, mostly state level, regulations directly affect both blue- and white-collar 
workers.1
Intended to improve service quality (Shapiro, 1986), limit negative externalities (Kleiner, 
2006), and reduce information asymmetries (Arrow, 1963, Akerlof, 1970, Leland, 1979), 
occupational licensing regulation does not necessarily improve consumer welfare because, unlike 
voluntary certification, it also increases barriers to entry. Theoretical models of industry 
dynamics based on Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Asplund and Nocke (2006) 
 
                                                 
1 For a detailed list, see, for instance, Bianco (1993). The Institute for Justice (Carpenter et al., 2012) recently 
published state licensing burdens for 102 low- and moderate-income occupations. 
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associate higher barriers to entry with reduced competition, which can harm consumers. Welfare 
loss is potentially especially large in industries characterized by frequently repeated purchases, 
limited potential for externalities, or easy-to-implement voluntary certification. 
This essay makes several contributions to the literature. First, the literature on 
occupational licensing has largely relied on survey data that provide limited information on the 
number, and entry and exit patterns of, practitioners in a market, and limited the outcomes 
explored mostly to earnings. I combine two comprehensive U.S. Census Bureau data sets (the 
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (ILBD)), 
in order to study the effect of occupational licensing on the per capita number, as well as entry 
and exit rates, of practitioners and thereby shed light on the effect of licensing on the intensity of 
competition. Second, I study the relationship between the intensity of occupational licensing and 
providers of the training. This relationship, which is crucial to a better understanding of the 
political economy of occupational licensing regulations, has been largely unexplored until now. 
Lastly, I study the effects of occupational licensing in the unique setting of the cosmetology 
industry, which provides jobs for more than a million practitioners. This industry is characterized 
by localized markets, relative within-industry homogeneity of occupations, substantial variation 
in regulation across the U.S. states, and sizable entry costs associated with licensing. 
I find no evidence that more intense occupational licensing regulation affects the 
equilibrium number of practitioners or leads to higher prices for consumers. I do find, however, 
that such regulation substantially reduces practitioner entry and exit rates. That fewer 
practitioners seem to test their fit for the occupation may result in lower ability practitioners 
being able to survive in more intensely regulated markets. Lastly, the evidence suggests that 
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providers are the clear beneficiary of more licensing, licensing intensity being associated with 
both larger numbers of instructors and larger producer surplus for training schools. 
The essay is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I briefly review the occupational 
licensing literature and describe the cosmetology industry. I present a theoretical framework in 
Section 1.3, describe the data in Section 1.4, and discuss my empirical approach and present 
results on practitioners in Section 1.5. Results on providers of occupational licensing training are 
reported in Section 1.6, and political economy and endogeneity considerations discussed in 
Section 1.7. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 1.8. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Occupational Licensing 
Occupational licensing regulation limits to those who satisfy licensing requirements the number 
of practitioners in an occupation. Discussion of the effects of such regulation on service 
providers and consumers dates at least to Adam Smith (1776), who noted how practitioners like 
cutlers, weavers, and hatters could restrict competition by prescribing in bylaws the length of 
training and limits on numbers of apprentices.  
Most empirical research on the effect of occupational licensing has focused on 
practitioner earnings. A large literature (e.g., Friedman and Kuznets, 1945, Kleiner and Kudrle, 
2000, Tenn, 2001, Angrist and Guryan, 2008, Kleiner and Park, 2010, Pagliero, 2011, Kleiner 
and Krueger, 2013, and Thornton and Timmons, 2013) suggests that occupational licensing has a 
positive effect on practitioners’ mean earnings. I revisit this issue in the context of cosmetology. 
The limited research that has focused on the relationship between occupational licensing 
and number of practitioners per capita fails to find significant effects (e.g., Thornton and 
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Weintraub (1979) for barbers, White (1980) for registered nurses, and Thornton and Timmons 
(2013), who find mixed evidence for massage therapists).2
Evidence on the impact of licensing on practitioner entry and exit is even more limited. 
Using a binary indicator for presence of licensing, Law and Kim (2005), using data for 1880-
1930, find licensing requirements too weak to affect the net growth of practitioners in most 
occupations. Although mentioned by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) as an example of local 
regulations that should increase entry costs, occupational licensing regulations are not considered 
in their empirical analysis. The literature, however, suggests that occupational licensing reduces 
interstate mobility of licensed professionals (Pashigian, 1979) and depresses the rate of 
immigration of workers in licensed occupations (Federman et al., 2006, Peterson et al., 2013).  
  
Although impact on quality of service is theoretically central to arguments for 
occupational licensing regulation, empirical evidence suggests that this relationship is weak at 
best. Larsen (2012) and Hotz and Xiao (2011) find mild positive effects, but most studies find 
either no (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000, Angrist and Guryan, 2008) or negative (Carroll and Gaston, 
1981, Kugler and Sauer, 2005) effects. The absence of differences in malpractice insurance rates 
between licensed and unlicensed states (Kleiner, 2006) is consistent with weak effects of 
licensing on quality. Data constraints preclude me from providing evidence on this question, but 
given the findings of the literature, this essay assumes no effect of licensing on quality.  
Previous studies of the personal care industries find little effect of an hours of training 
licensing requirement on practitioner supply (Thornton and Weintraub, 1979), earnings (Kleiner, 
2000, Timmons and Thornton, 2010), or vocational class enrollment (Klee, 2010). Only Adams 
                                                 
2 Evidence on the effect of licensing regulation for nurse practitioners and physician assistants on health care service 
utilization is also mixed (Stange, 2012).  
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et al. (2002) provide some evidence suggestive of lower quantities and higher prices of 
transacted services in states with more stringent requirements. 
1.2.2 Cosmetology 
The standard industrial classifications, such as Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), do not distinguish between cosmetologists, 
hairdressers, hair designers, and hair stylists. These occupations being subject to the same 
required number of hours of training in most states, I treat them as a single category and refer to 
them collectively as “cosmetologists.”3
Its idiosyncrasies make cosmetology an ideal industry in which to study the effects of 
occupational licensing. First, licensing can impose substantial costs, especially relative to 
practitioner earnings, on entry to the occupation. In 2010, the average number of required hours 
of training was 1,599, the median annual wage of a cosmetology employee $22,760.
  
4 For a 
conservatively chosen tuition rate of $5/hour, and opportunity costs of time of $7.25/hour 
(Federal Minimum Wage), the entry costs would be $19,588,5
                                                 
3 The six-digit NAICS industrial code for cosmetologists is 812112. In 2010, there were 667,277 cosmetology 
nonemployer businesses (Nonemployer Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau), defined as businesses with no paid 
employees, and 75,355 cosmetology employer establishments with 442,149 employees (County Business Patterns, 
U.S. Census Bureau). Barbers constitute a separate industrial category with a separate occupational licensing 
regulation. The barbering industry, in terms of number of practitioners, is only about one ninth the size of the 
cosmetology industry. 
 in relative terms, 86 percent of the 
median practitioner’s annual wage. Using a more realistic tuition rate of $10/hour, the costs 
amount to 121 percent of the median practitioner’s annual wage. 
4 Occupational Employment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
5 Interviews with industry insiders and extensive Internet search suggest that five dollars per training hour is on the 
conservative end of the spectrum. More prestigious schools, such as the Aveda Institute, often charge more than ten 
dollars per training hour, and tuition in the Empire Education Group, the largest cosmetology school operator in 
North America, ranges between nine and twelve dollars per training hour. 
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Second, licensing requirements vary considerably across states.6
Third, the non-tradable character of the services and limited willingness of consumers to 
travel to have their hair cut or styled renders cosmetology markets local. This study thus benefits 
from a high number of localized markets, which I equate with counties.
 Of the several 
dimensions of licensing requirements (e.g., presence of a practical licensing exam, differences in 
state reciprocity provisions, and required years of general education), I consider number of hours 
of training required to be the most important source of differences in costs of regulation for 
prospective practitioners. Cosmetology training requirements differ by as many as 1,100 hours 
across states (standard deviation of 254). Factoring in tuition at $10/hour and opportunity costs, 
this difference corresponds to as much as $18,975, or 83 percent of a median practitioner’s 
annual wage. 
7
Finally, because in many industries establishments employ workers from many distinct 
occupations, industry-based business data often cannot be used to study regulation of a specific 
occupation. But in the cosmetology industry, firms employ mainly cosmetologists. Table 1.1 lists 
the main occupations in the cosmetology industry. If supervisors are considered cosmetology 
practitioners, more than eighty percent of individuals working in the cosmetology industry are, in 
 Whereas some papers 
take as their definitions of local markets small isolated town and cities (e.g., Bresnahan and 
Reiss, 1991) and others Component Economic Areas (e.g., Syverson, 2004), lower travel 
distances for consumers of personal services together with the availability of a wide set of 
control variables make a county-based definition of markets most suitable. 
                                                 
6 Mention of U.S. states is understood to include the District of Columbia (D.C.).  
7 I use states as the relevant market definition in the analyses of occupational licensing training because of the 
greater distance students are willing to travel to get trained relative to the distance consumers are willing to travel to 
get their hair cut or styled.  
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fact, cosmetologists.8
The Economic Census of 2007 provides information on various business characteristics 
of the industry. Nonemployer practitioners, for instance, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as 
businesses with no paid employees generated 38 percent of total cosmetology revenues of $32.2 
billion in 2007.
 Cosmetologists can thus be tracked fairly accurately in U.S. Census 
Bureau business data, especially if the fraction of non-cosmetologists within the cosmetology 
industrial category is stable across states. The high fraction of cosmetologists within the 
cosmetology industrial category enables me to explore the relationship between intensity of 
occupational licensing and such key business outcomes as the number of practitioners in a 
market, their entry and exit rates, and the revenue gap between entrants and incumbents, and 
thereby shed light on competition, industry dynamics, and possible selection due to occupational 
licensing regulation. 
9
                                                 
8 Scali-Sheahan (2008) notes that data on numbers of licensed practitioners traditionally compiled by professional 
organizations are no longer being collected. The comprehensive U.S. Census Bureau business data enable me to 
circumvent this problem.  
 In terms of legal form of organization, 98 percent of nonemployer businesses 
are proprietorships. With respect to employer establishments, 59 percent are corporations, 30 
percent proprietorships, and 11 percent partnerships. Hair care services are responsible for 78 
percent, merchandise sales for about six percent, skin-care services for five percent, and nail 
services for four percent of the revenues of cosmetology employer establishments. Massage and 
hair removal services and office space rentals account for the remaining seven percent. 
9 I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) to convert all variables denominated in current 
dollars to constant 2010 base, denoted in the tables by (2010 $).  
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
Because occupational licensing regulation increases the costs of entry, it should have a negative 
effect on the equilibrium number of practitioners in an industry. In states with more stringent 
regulation, the quantity of services provided is expected to be lower and price of services higher. 
To provide intuition for the expected effect of sunk entry costs on equilibrium industry 
dynamics, that is, on entry and exit rates, I briefly describe a model by Backus (2012) that builds 
on Hopenhayn (1992) and Asplund and Nocke (2006). 
Businesses in the model are assumed to be infinitesimally small and the number of ex 
ante identical potential entrants unlimited. Entrants pay the sunk costs of entry S to become 
active and learn their ability 𝜃𝑡, which positively affects current period profitability 𝜋𝑡 and, over 
time, evolves according to a Markov process based on a cumulative distribution function 
𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃𝑡). Every period, each incumbent decides, based on ability 𝜃𝑡 and intensity of 
competition Ct in the market, whether to remain or exit the industry. Intensity of competition is 
captured by the distribution of types of active businesses. The payoff from exiting is normalized 
to zero. 
The value function of an active business can be written recursively as, 
𝑉𝑡(𝜃𝑡,𝐶𝑡)  =  𝜋𝑡(𝜃𝑡 ,𝐶𝑡)  +  𝑚𝑎𝑥 �0,𝛽�𝑉𝑡+1(𝜃𝑡+1,𝐶𝑡+1)𝑑𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃𝑡)� 
where 𝛽 is a discount factor. If entry is positive in equilibrium, the ex ante expected value of 
entering for an entrant of ability 𝜃𝐸  facing level of competition 𝐶∗ has to be equal to the sunk 
costs of entry, 
∫𝛽𝑉𝑡+1(𝜃𝑡+1,𝐶∗)𝑑𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃𝐸) = 𝑆𝑡. 
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The exit strategy is summarized by a threshold rule that requires practitioners with ability 
equal to the exit threshold to be indifferent between remaining and exiting, 
∫𝑉𝑡+1(𝜃𝑡+1,𝐶∗)𝑑𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃∗) =  0. 
Intensity of competition is determined by the distribution of entrant types, and of 
incumbent types from the previous period, 
𝐶𝑡+1(𝜃𝑡+1)  = 𝛾∗ 𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃𝐸) + ∫ 𝐹(𝜃𝑡+1|𝜃𝑡)1𝜃∗ 𝑑𝐶(𝜃𝑡). 
A stationary competitive equilibrium of this game yields an equilibrium entry 𝛾∗, ability 
threshold 𝜃∗ below which incumbent businesses exit, as well as equilibrium intensity of 
competition 𝐶∗.  
The model implies that higher sunk costs of entry result in lower entry and exit rates.10
1.4 Data 
 
The proof, done by Backus (2012), is conducted in two steps. First, it can be shown that higher 
sunk costs of entry imply a lower exit threshold. Second, entry and exit rates increase in the exit 
threshold. Higher sunk costs of entry thus imply lower equilibrium entry and exit rates.  
1.4.1 Licensing Regulation 
Licensing requirements for cosmetologists have been around for decades, the first U.S. state to 
enact such regulation being Georgia, in 1914. By 1950, cosmetologists faced licensing 
requirements in 45 states (Council of State Governments, 1952). Hours of training required have 
been remarkably stable within states since at least the early 1980s. The median state hours 
requirement has been constant since that time as well, at 1,500 hours.  
                                                 
10 Entry rate equals exit rate in equilibrium.  
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Because I am interested in long-run equilibrium outcomes, sunk costs of obtaining a 
license being irrelevant in the short run, my analyses focus on states with a stable hours 
requirement. I therefore consider only states in the contiguous United States with no documented 
change in the cosmetology training hours requirement from 1981 to 201011 and no multiple 
licensing categories within cosmetology.12 The hours of training required in all U.S. states in 
2010, and the 32 states that satisfy the aforementioned restrictions, are listed in Appendix 1.A 
(and depicted as well in a map in Figure 1.1).13
Occupational licensing regulation is binding for all practitioners. Some states 
automatically license practitioners from other states with similar licensing requirements; other 
states require practitioners to take a new state licensing exam. Substituting years of practice for 
part of the hours requirement, in states in which it is permitted, enables some migrating 
practitioners, especially those migrating from low to high hours training requirement states, to 
take the licensing exam in a new state without having to return to a training school.
 The latter states accounted for 72.1 percent of the 
U.S. population in 2010. 
14
 Because building a clientele base is important in this industry, moving between states to 
avoid stricter licensing regulation is unlikely to be common. Working unlicensed, because it is 
usually a misdemeanor punishable by a fine and possibly imprisonment, is also unlikely. 
 
                                                 
11 These years are determined by the availability of occupational licensing regulation data. 
12 Because they have multiple licensing categories with differing hours requirements, I exclude Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, and Wyoming. Colorado, for instance, requires cosmetologists to have 1,800 hours of training, 
hairstylists 1,200 hours of training. 
13 For robustness, I consider an extended set of states that had neither any change in the hours regulation in the 
1993-2010 period nor multiple licensing categories (except for Georgia, in which cosmetology and hair stylist 
categories differ by only 175 hours). The 44 states are depicted in Figure 1.2. The results are consistent with the 
results from the baseline set of 32 states. 
14 In Michigan, for instance, the conversion rate is six months of experience for every hundred hours of training a 
cosmetologist lacks. Thus, an individual newly licensed in New York (1,000 hour requirement) who wants to move 
to Michigan (1,500 hour requirement) must either make up the difference in hours by returning to a cosmetology 
school or have practiced in New York for at least 30 months ((1,500 hrs. - 1,000 hrs.)/100 × 6 months). 
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Because they provide services to the public, cosmetologists would find it difficult to work 
clandestinely without the authorities or competitors noticing.15
Although the barrier occupational licensing poses to entry, because it is likely to decrease 
competition, might benefit practitioners by enabling them to earn more, this benefit may be 
offset by the costly upfront investment required to acquire a license. Schools that provide 
training, however, are likely benefit from occupational licensing because individuals who want 
to become licensed must be trained in an approved school. Schools benefit from higher 
regulation if demand for training services is inelastic with respect to the hours requirement, and 
profit as well from student tuition and revenues earned by students practicing during training. 
Currently licensed cosmetologists would likely be worse off were licensing to be relaxed as 
competition would likely increase.  
 
Information on licensing requirements is from several sources. Information on 
cosmetology licensing requirements for 2010 is from the 2010 Endorsement Report of the 
National-Interstate Council of State Boards of Cosmetology as well as my own compilations 
based on searches of individual state statutes, e-mail exchanges, and telephone interviews with 
representatives of state regulation boards and cosmetology schools. Morris Kleiner provided 
historical cosmetology regulation data dating back to 1981.16
                                                 
15 In states like Texas and California, detection of unlicensed practitioners by authorities is facilitated by the 
availability of an online complaint form that can be filed anonymously. 
 Information on cosmetology 
regulation in 1993 is from Bianco (1993). The mean of mandated training hours over the 32 
states in my sample is 1,567 hours. In the regressions, I measure the training hours requirement 
in hundreds of hours. 
16 These data are used in Kleiner (2006). 
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1.4.2 Dependent Variables - Practitioners 
My empirical analyses rely on multiple sources of data.17
The ILBD contains annual information on geographic location and annual revenues for 
all private sector nonemployer businesses in the United States.
 The equilibrium number of 
practitioners per capita and their entry and exit rates are constructed from two confidential U.S. 
Census Bureau databases, the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and Integrated 
Longitudinal Business Database (ILBD). The LBD and ILBD provide not only more detailed 
information on businesses than publicly available data like the County Business Patterns and 
Nonemployer Statistics, but also linkages of employer establishments and nonemployer 
businesses over time that enable me to create county-year level measures of practitioner entry 
and exit. 
18 Defined as businesses with no 
paid employees, nonemployer businesses accounted for 57 percent of cosmetology practitioners. 
I use the ILBD for 1994-2010, which is the longest uninterrupted interval currently available. 
The LBD provides annual information on location and employment for all private sector 
employer establishments in the United States19
I assume a single practitioner to be involved in each nonemployer business, and employer 
establishments to have one practicing owner (partnerships, two practicing owners) and 
 As well as analyzing the effect of licensing only 
on nonemployer practitioners, I also combine the ILBD and LBD to provide evidence on all 
cosmetology practitioners.  
                                                 
17 Appendix 1.B lists all dependent variables, the level at which they vary, and the data source.  
18 The ILBD, described in some detail by Davis et al. (2007), draws on information from individual and corporate 
tax returns and various business surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
19 Information on the construction of the LBD can be found in Jarmin and Miranda (2002). 
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exclusively practitioner employees.20
As the equilibrium number of provided services is affected not only by the number of 
practitioners, but also by how much those practitioners work, I use the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
publicly available American Community Survey (ACS) to investigate whether occupation 
licensing affects practitioners’ weekly work hours (neither the ILBD nor LBD contain 
information on weekly hours of work).
 The number of practitioners per capita is defined as the 
number of practitioners in a county divided by the county’s population. Table 1.2 shows there to 
be, on average, 245 cosmetology practitioners per hundred thousand people, 178 of which are 
nonemployers. I focus only on the 32 states with stable licensing requirements, as discussed in 
Section 1.4.1. To simplify disclosure of results from the Census Bureau, I also consider only 
counties that had at least one cosmetology practitioner each year during the 1995-2009 period. 
This restriction is binding for less than two percent of counties. My sample for the county-level 
analyses consists of 2,055 observations (counties) per year. 
21
Entry and exit rates, defined at the county-year level, are based on information in the 
ILBD and LBD. For nonemployers, entrants are practitioners whose businesses are operating in 
the current period but were not in the market in the previous period. Entry rates are calculated as 
the ratio of year t number of entrants to year t-1 number of practitioners. I create in a similar 
 Table 1.3, which provides descriptive statistics for the 
individual level data from the ACS, shows cosmetology practitioners to be, on average, 41 years 
of age, work, on average, 33.6 hours per week, and be mostly women. Constrained by the level 
of detail in the ACS data, the hours of work analyses are done only at the state-year level. 
                                                 
20 To limit the influence of measurement error and outliers, I consider only establishments in which the number of 
employees does not exceed the 99.99th percentile number of employees and adjusted average annual revenues are 
between $1,000 and $150,000 (2010 $). 
21 I use surveys for 2000-2011, currently the longest available span. As the ACS’s question on usual weekly hours 
worked is asked for the year preceding the survey, my analyses span 1999-2010. 
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manner a county-year count of exiters. These are practitioners whose businesses are operating in 
the current period but are not in the market the following period. Exit rates are calculated as the 
ratio of year t number of exiters to year t number of practitioners. Table 1.2 shows nonemployer 
entry rates to have a mean of 26.6 percent and nonemployer exit rates a mean of 23.7 percent. As 
expected for an industry in long-run equilibrium and predicted by the model in Section 1.3, the 
entry rates are statistically no different from the exit rates. 
For robustness, I create entry and exit rates for all, nonemployer and employer, 
practitioners. Entry and exit of the employer establishments is analogous to the nonemployer 
universe, differing only in terms of weighting by the number of practitioners in an establishment. 
Expansions and contractions of continuing establishments require some additional assumptions, 
as I do not have unique identifiers for individual practitioners within a business establishment. 
Expansion of an employer establishment is assumed to be covered by new practitioners, 
contractions due to practitioners exiting the profession. Continuing employer establishments that 
remain at the same employment size are assumed to retain the same practitioners, although, in 
fact, entering practitioners could have exactly offset exiting practitioners. Because of the 
additional assumptions needed because of the LBD data limitations, I use the combined 
nonemployer and employer measures only for robustness checks, and focus my analyses 
primarily on nonemployer entry and exit rates.  
The entry rates I obtain are likely to be somewhat greater than measures based on new 
licensees. For example, the entry rate for Texas, which has been publishing data on numbers of 
new licensees, is about eighteen percent. I find higher rates because not all entrants are newly 
licensed practitioners. Exit rates are also likely to be greater than measures based on 
practitioners’ terminal exits from a profession. Higher entry and exit rates do not pose a problem 
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for my entry and exit analyses as long as differences between the business-based measures I use 
and practitioner-based measures are not correlated with the intensity of occupational licensing. 
Although the information from the LBD and ILBD enables me to measure my main 
variables of interest, number of practitioners per capita and practitioner entry and exit rates, 
occupational licensing regulation, as noted earlier, is also expected to affect practitioner earnings 
and consumer prices. From the ILBD, I obtain gross revenues of nonemployer practitioners from 
which I calculate median nonemployer practitioner revenues for each county and year. This 
variable and all other variables denominated in current dollars are converted to a constant 2010 
base using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). The mean of median 
nonemployer practitioner revenues is $15,993. This value being smaller than the median annual 
full-time wage of $22,760 reported by the Occupational Employment Statistics for 2010, it 
would appear that many practitioners are either not able to capture enough clientele or are 
working part time.  
For consumer prices, I generate state-year level average prices for women’s cut and 
shampoo blow-dry from Cost of Living Index (COLI) data derived from a survey of 
establishments in urban areas and published by the Council for Community and Economic 
Research (C2ER). Table 1.4 shows the mean price of women’s cut and shampoo blow-dry to be 
$30.4, with a standard deviation of $5.5.  
To provide insight into selection of practitioners caused by occupational licensing, I use 
the ILBD to define a gap in nonemployer entrants’ revenues as the median annual revenues of an 
incumbent minus the median annual revenues of an entrant within the same market. As expected, 
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the median entrant has, on average, smaller revenues than the median incumbent, the average 
gap, as can be seen in Table 1.2, being $4,334. 
1.4.3 Dependent Variables - Providers of Occupational Training 
The Economic Census for 2007 identifies 1,727 cosmetology and barber schools with 15,999 
employees and revenues of more than $1.3 billion. Eighty-three percent of these schools’ 
revenues were generated by occupational training, seven percent by personal care services, and 
the remaining ten percent by merchandise sales, office space rentals, and other activities.  
The relevant market for schools being geographically larger than that for cosmetology 
services, and number of schools in a typical county being small, I analyze providers of 
occupational training at the state level. Although the NAICS industrial classification does not 
distinguish between cosmetology and barber schools (NAICS 611511), cosmetology schools 
accounted for more than 94 percent of cosmetology and barber school establishments in 
December 2011 according to the U.S. Department of Education Database of Accredited 
Postsecondary Institutions and Programs. Thus, I restrict the current analyses to the set of 32 
states used in the cosmetology practitioner analyses, and consider cosmetology hours 
requirements to be the relevant measure of required training.  
Using the LBD database and Census population data, I calculate Instructors per Capita, 
defined as the number of instructors in a given state divided by the state’s population. All 
employees as well as owners of school establishments are assumed to be instructors. I assume 
each establishment to have one owner (partnerships, two owners). Table 1.5 shows there to be 
4.8 cosmetology instructors per 100,000 people. Number of School Establishments, also 
measured at the state-year level, is, on average, 33 per state. School Establishment Size, being 
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the median number of instructors per establishment in the state-year, is, on average, 8.9. 
Instructors’ Median Wage, calculated from the LBD’s annual payroll and number of employees 
per establishment, is $23,774. Average Revenues per School Establishment is calculated from 
the publicly available version of the Economic Census of 2002 (EC 2002). These data include 
total annual training school revenues at the state level, which I divide by the number of the 
school establishments in the state that year. The mean is $579,054. Average Gross Margin per 
School Establishment is defined as annual state training school revenues minus total payroll 
divided by the number of school establishments in the state that year. The mean is $383,801. 
Although fairly large, this margin is not equal to the economic rent, as school establishments also 
have to cover office rent, cost of energy and materials, and the opportunity costs of the owner. 
1.4.4 Market Characteristics 
Throughout my analyses, I control for a number of market-level characteristics. Campbell and 
Hopenhayn (2005) and Asplund and Nocke (2006) show that intensity of competition and 
industry turnover should increase with market size. I therefore include in all regressions yearly 
population levels and demographics (age, gender, and race composition) obtained from the 
County Population Estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau from 1995 to 2009.22
                                                 
22 In specifications that analyze the impact of licensing on the number of practitioners per capita, population is used 
only to create the dependent variable, not as a control variable. Because I include number of practitioners per capita 
in the regression as a dependent variable only after logarithmic transformation, the elasticity of population with 
respect to the number of practitioners is restricted to one. 
 Table 1.2 shows 
the average county population to be about one hundred thousand people. County data on annual 
personal income per capita, which is assumed to positively affect demand for cosmetology 
services, are from the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Mean 
personal income per capita is $30,278. County geographic area, which may affect consumer 
commuting distance and thus intensity of competition, and high school educational attainment 
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data, which may affect the supply of practitioners, are from the U.S. Census Bureau State and 
County QuickFacts.23
To control for possible unobserved factors that may affect economic outcomes in densely 
populated areas and are not fully captured by population and personal income variables (e.g., 
higher office rent), I include in the county-level analyses a binary indicator for central counties 
of metropolitan statistical areas obtained from U.S. Census Bureau Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas data. To account for the possibility that states with more stringent 
occupational licensing regulation may have also adopted other business regulations that might 
affect my analyses, I include the Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) for the year 2000 
produced by the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council (Keating, 2000) and designed to 
reflect major state-level costs imposed on businesses; the greater the index, the greater the costs. 
In the sample, the index ranges from 24.9 (South Dakota) to 68.2 (D.C.). 
 County-level data on annual unemployment rates, which may influence 
both demand for services and supply of practitioners, are from the Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The unemployment rate averages 5.6 percent. 
In all the state-level analyses including analyses of number of hours worked, price of service, 
and providers of occupational training the market characteristics are included at the state level. 
1.5 Econometric Specifications and Results 
The theoretical framework in Section 1.3 provides several predictions about the effects of 
occupational licensing regulation that I investigate in this section. I first test whether 
occupational licensing negatively affects number of practitioners per capita and quantity of 
services provided by examining the number of practitioners per capita and hours of work per 
                                                 
23 Educational attainment data from the U.S. Census Bureau State and County QuickFacts are cross-sectional; 
Census derives them from the American Community Surveys from 2007-2011. 
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practitioner. I next test whether prices are higher in markets with more stringent occupational 
licensing and, using nonemployer revenue data, also estimate whether practitioner revenues are 
higher in such markets. I then examine the effects of occupational licensing on entry and exit 
rates, which, based on the model of long-run industry dynamics described in Section 1.3, should 
be lower in markets with more stringent requirements. To provide insight into selection due to 
occupational licensing, I test whether entrants do better, relative to incumbents, in more 
regulated markets. I expect the gap in revenues between entrants who test their fit for the 
occupation and incumbents to be larger in markets with low occupational licensing 
requirements.24
To study the effects of occupational licensing, I rely on variation in the intensity of 
licensing training requirements across states. As the effect of licensing intensity cannot be 
identified together with state fixed effects, to mitigate concerns about omitted variable bias, my 
specifications include an extensive list of variables that might be both correlated with the 
intensity of occupational licensing regulation and affect the outcomes of interest. The 
specifications also include year and Census division fixed effects to account for such unobserved 
factors as differences in tastes across divisions and time.
 
25
1.5.1 Number of Practitioners per Capita and Usual Hours of Work 
 
Based on the theoretical framework in Section 1.3, regulation is expected to have a negative 
effect on number of practitioners per capita. I therefore estimate the following equation, 
𝑌𝑐𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑅𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡  +  𝜂𝑡  × 𝛿𝑑 +  𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 
                                                 
24 Based on the model in Section 1.3, the ability threshold 𝜃∗ for surviving in the market with lower sunk costs is 
higher. 
25 The U.S. Census Bureau defines nine divisions, namely, New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West 
North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. 
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where the c subscript indexes counties, the s subscript states, d subscript geographical divisions 
within the United States, and the t subscript years.26
The vector of control variables (Xcst) includes the county-year log of per capita personal 
income, unemployment rate, and county demographics, specifically, the gender, race, and age 
compositions of the population. It also contains county-level geographic area, high school 
education, a state-level indicator for the general business environment (SBSI index), and a binary 
variable for whether the observation comes from a central county of a metropolitan statistical 
area. To account for common unobserved factors within years and U.S. Census Bureau divisions, 
I include year fixed effects interacted with division fixed effects, denoted by ηt × δd. Because the 
outcomes of interest may be correlated across counties within a state as well as over time, 
standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
 My analyses cover 2,055 counties in 32 
states over 15 years. In this specification, Ycst is the log of per capita number of practitioners. The 
natural logarithm is used to limit the impact of outliers. For the same reason, I perform a 
logarithmic transformation for two control variables, personal income per capita and geographic 
area. The main independent variable of interest is Regulation (Rs), measured in hundreds of 
hours of training required. 
The results in Table 1.6 imply no effect of intensity of licensing training on number of 
practitioners per capita. In the specification with year-division fixed effects (column 2), the 
effect of an extra one hundred hours of training requirement on number of practitioners per 
capita is -0.3 percent and not statistically different from zero. This finding is surprising because 
occupational licensing is expected to reduce the number of practitioners. At the conventional 
                                                 
26 To simplify disclosure review of the results by the U.S. Census Bureau, all regression analyses are provided for 
1995-2009. Year 1994 data were used to define entry rates for the year 1995 and year 2010 data to define exit rates 
in 2009.  
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statistical significance level, however, the confidence interval allows me to detect only an effect 
larger than one percent. Thus, a reduction, if there is one, must be relatively small. Considering 
only nonemployer practitioners (column 4) yields the same conclusion. 
Because the total number of hours cosmetology practitioners provide is affected by not 
only the number of practitioners, but also the number of hours they work, I employ the ACS data 
that contain information on cosmetologists’ usual weekly hours. To analyze whether 
practitioners work fewer hours in states with more intense occupational licensing regulation, I 
estimate the following equation, 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑅𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡  +  𝜂𝑡  +  𝛿𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡  
where the i subscript indexes individual practitioners, the s subscript states, the d subscript 
geographical divisions within the United States, and the t subscript years. The regression is a 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). The results in Table 1.7 suggest that cosmetologists do not 
work more hours in more intensely regulated states. In the specification with year-division fixed 
effects (column 2), the effect of an extra one hundred hours of training requirement on the usual 
weekly hours of work is 0.1 percent and not statistically different from zero. The standard errors 
are, however, large, and at the conventional statistical significance level allow me to detect only 
an effect larger than 6.7 percent. 
In the aggregate, the results for number of practitioners and their usual hours of work 
suggest, quite surprisingly, no significant effect of occupational licensing on the equilibrium 
quantity of services provided. 
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1.5.2 Consumer Prices and Practitioner Earnings 
Occupational licensing may affect prices by increasing practitioner skill and thus improving the 
quality of services rendered, or by reducing competition, enabling existing providers to charge 
more. I do not find any effect of licensing regulation on consumer prices, as shown in Table 1.8. 
In the specification with year-division fixed effects (column 2), the effect of an extra one 
hundred hours of training requirement on the price of a women’s cut and shampoo blow-dry is 
close to zero. The standard errors are, however, somewhat large, and allow me to detect, at the 
conventional statistical significance level, only an effect greater than 1.5 percent. The finding of 
no significant results on prices, although surprising, taken together with the foregoing finding of 
no effect on per capita number of practitioners, suggests that consumers may not experience 
negative consequences, in terms of higher prices or fewer providers, of more stringent 
occupational licensing. 
To increase confidence in my findings on prices and hours of work, I examine the effect 
of licensing on median practitioner annual revenues. As I do not find effects of occupational 
licensing on prices of cosmetology services or cosmetology practitioners’ usual hours of work, I 
do not expect to find any effect of occupational licensing on annual revenues. Table 1.9 shows 
that, in the specification with year-division fixed effects (column 2), the effect of an extra one 
hundred hours of training requirement on median practitioner revenues is small and only 
marginally statistically significant. Annual revenues of the median practitioner in the county are 
thus surely not higher in more regulated markets.  
1.5.3 Industry Dynamics - Entry and Exit Rates 
The model described in Section 1.3 assumes equilibrium entry and exit rates to be equal in a 
long-run equilibrium, and implies that they should be negatively related to the sunk costs of 
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entry. I test this prediction with a specification similar to those in Section 1.5.1. In the entry rate 
specification, however, I use control variables lagged by one year, as it may be last year’s market 
conditions that drive potential practitioners’ decisions to start occupational licensing training. I 
estimate the following equation,  
𝑌𝑐𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑅𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑐𝑠(𝑡−1)  +  𝜂𝑡  × 𝛿𝑑 +  𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 
where, again, the c subscript indexes counties, the s subscript states, the d subscript geographical 
divisions within the United States, and the t subscript years. Controlling for year times division 
fixed effects in Table 1.10, column 2, produces entry rates smaller by half a percentage point per 
hundred hours of licensing requirement. This is a substantial effect, given a mean entry rate of 
24.9 percent. The effect is slightly stronger when only nonemployer practitioners, for whom the 
constructed entry (and exit) measures have less measurement error, are considered, as discussed 
in Section 1.4. Entry rate results are robust to considering current period control variables. As 
expected based on the model, and as can be seen in columns 2 and 4 in the second half of the 
table, the effect on exit rates is similar in magnitude to the effect on entry rates. The findings on 
entry and exit rates are consistent with the predictions of the long-run industry dynamics model, 
which implies entry and exit rates lower in markets with more stringent requirements. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the effect of regulation on prices and revenues is 
small at best. Entrants in highly regulated markets might, however, through more training, be 
able to earn higher revenues than those in less regulated markets without affecting median 
revenues in the market.  
In a last set of analyses of practitioners, I consider a specification similar to those in 
Section 1.5.1, in which the dependent variable is, however, the revenue gap between the median 
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entrant and median incumbent nonemployer practitioner in a market. The results, reported in 
Table 1.11, suggest that entrants’ revenues are greater relative to those of incumbents in states 
with a higher hours requirement. The gap is $182 in annual revenues per hundred hours’ 
difference in licensing requirement. Entering practitioners might thus still be able to recoup at 
least part of the cost of a higher occupational licensing requirement by being able to earn more 
from the start. The results are robust to considering a gap normalized by median nonemployer 
revenues in the market that year. 
1.6 Providers of Occupational Training 
Turning to the link between the intensity of occupational licensing and outcomes for training 
providers, I estimate the relationship between regulation and number of instructors per capita, 
number of training school establishments, and median school establishment size. I use a 
specification similar to that used in the per capita number of practitioners’ regressions and rely 
again on cross-state variation in the hours requirements. Observations, however, are at the state-
year instead of county-year level, as the relevant market for schools is geographically larger than 
that for cosmetology services and the number of schools in a typical county small. 
The results, reported in Table 1.12, show states with more intense training requirements 
to have more instructors per capita. This is not surprising, given the above documented lack of a 
negative effect of regulation on per capita number of practitioners. If number of instructors is 
proportional to average required number of training hours in the sample, specifically 1,567 
hours, an increase of one hundred hours in the licensing requirement corresponds to 6.4 percent 
increase (100*100%/1,567) in the number of instructors needed. The actual estimate with 
division fixed effects is 5.1 percent, which is somewhat smaller and could be explained by my 
finding of lower entry rates in markets with more stringent occupational licensing. As can be 
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seen in the last column of Table 1.12, however, instructors in more regulated states are not better 
paid. The estimated coefficient is close to zero. The training requirement also does not affect 
number of school establishments, as can be seen in column 2 of Table 1.13. The standard errors 
are, however, somewhat large, and would enable me to detect an effect of at least 3.8 percent per 
hundred hours. The median size of the school establishment, in terms of number of instructors, is 
larger in more intensely regulated states by about 6.3 percent, as shown in column 4 of the table.  
In Table 1.14, I report results on the relationship between the hours training requirement 
and schools’ revenues and gross margins, which imply that average revenues of school 
establishments are greater in states with more stringent licensing. Although these regressions are 
limited to a single year and the sample is relatively small, the estimates are large and statistically 
significant.27
1.7 Political Economy and Endogeneity 
 Gross margins earned by these schools (i.e., revenues minus payroll) are also 
substantially larger in more stringently regulated states. When I include division fixed effects to 
control for tastes and other unobserved division-level differences, the effect is about twenty 
percent per hundred hours of training requirement, as can be seen in the last column of 
Table 1.14. Given the large magnitude of this coefficient, schools, even when their larger size 
(Table 1.13, last column) is taken into consideration, seem to do better in more regulated states. 
Together, these findings suggest that the benefits of occupational licensing accrue mostly to 
owners of schools. 
Angel (1970) cites as two of the main reasons for growth in licensing public demand for 
increased protection and pressure by members of occupational groups on state legislators. 
                                                 
27 The sample is small because, I currently have to rely only on publicly available aggregate information from the 
Economic Census of 2002, which provides information for only a subset of states. 
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Stigler (1971), discussing the political economy aspects of these types of regulations, suggests 
that occupations in states with greater occupational size relative to the total labor force become 
subject to licensing requirements earlier. The capture theory of occupational licensing is 
supported by Pagliero (2011). Other research concludes that the political economy aspects of 
occupational licensing regulation affect both the timing and intensity of regulation (Wheelan, 
1998, Tenn, 2001, Law and Kim, 2005). 
One implication of the political economy view of these regulations is that reverse 
causality might be a concern when estimating the effects of occupational licensing. That is, 
occupational licensing regulation may be more stringent in states with a greater number of 
practitioners per capita because of their political power and desire to limit the number of future 
entrants. 
To shed light on this question, I regress the current intensity of regulation in states with 
stable licensing requirements on number of practitioners per capita and fraction of urban 
population in the Census years 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. Because the historical Census did 
not separate the two, I include as practitioners both barbers and hairdressers. My finding that 
states with more practitioners per capita adopted more stringent hours requirements is shown in 
Specification A in Table 1.15. When I include division fixed effects (Specification B), however, 
the coefficients become smaller and statistically not significant. I also find that states with a 
higher number of cosmetology practitioners per capita adopt licensing regulation for the 
occupation sooner (Specification A, Appendix 1.C).28
                                                 
28 Law and Kim (2005) find the same pattern using a hazard model. 
 As above, with division fixed effects the 
coefficients become smaller and statistically not significant (Specification B, Appendix 1.C). 
Altogether, the results confirm the importance of including division fixed effects in analyses of 
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the effects of licensing regulations. However, as my analyses focus on recent years in states with 
stable hours requirements, the causes of behind regulation intensity, unless they persist over very 
long horizons, should be irrelevant. 
A second concern is that reliance on cross-state variation might admit the possibility of 
omitted variable bias if some other market-level factors not controlled for in the empirical 
analyses are both correlated with the regulation and affect the outcomes. Because I am unable to 
completely rule out such a possibility, I include an extensive list of variables that might be 
correlated with the intensity of the occupational licensing regulation and affect the outcomes of 
interest, such as market-level population, per capita mean personal income, demographic 
characteristics (age, gender, and race composition), fraction of the population with at least a high 
school diploma, unemployment rate, geographic area, and SBSI index (which is designed to 
reflect major state-level costs imposed on businesses). To further mitigate this concern, I include 
year, or year interacted with division fixed effects. 
A third concern is the focus only on states with stable licensing environments, which 
might possibly differ from states not included along a dimension other than, but correlated with, 
cosmetology licensing regulation. Descriptive statistics comparing states with low, medium, and 
high hours of regulation intensity with states that recently changed their regulation and were thus 
excluded are reported in Appendix 1.D. There is no apparent pattern suggesting that states 
excluded would differ from those included in the analyses. Regression results reported in 
Appendix 1.E show the excluded states not to be significantly different from the states included 
in the analyses along any of the considered dimensions including per capita number of 
cosmetology practitioners, prices of cosmetology services, personal income per capita, 
demographic composition, geographic area, or SBSI index. This increases my confidence that 
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the set of excluded states is not significantly different from the states considered in my analyses. 
Including division fixed effects, as described above, further mitigates this concern. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This essay provides empirical evidence of the effects of occupational licensing on business 
activity, price of services, industry dynamics, selection, and providers of licensing training in the 
context of cosmetology. I find that states with more intense licensing requirements have neither 
fewer practitioners per capita nor higher prices for services. They do, however, have significantly 
lower entry and exit rates. The evidence is suggestive of fewer practitioners testing their fit for 
the occupation in states with more intense regulation, allowing even lower ability practitioners to 
survive in the market. I also find states with more stringent licensing requirements to have more 
occupational training instructors, a larger median size of training facilities, and larger school 
revenues and gross profits. Instructors, however, do not earn more in such states. These findings 
suggest that the benefits of occupational licensing accrue mostly to owners of training schools.  
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Table 1.1 – Occupations in the Cosmetology Industry 
Occupation Cosmetology Industry (NAICS 812112) 
Hairdressers, Hairstylists, and Cosmetologists (%) 77.2 
Miscellaneous Personal Appearance Workers (%) 6.8 
Supervisors (%) 6.0 
Receptionists (%) 4.7 
Barbers (%) 0.7 
Other (%) 4.6 
Number of Observations 90,269 
Source: IPUMS-ACS,29
  
 2001-2011 
                                                 
29 The IPUMS ACS data are available courtesy of Ruggles et al. (2010). 
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Table 1.2 – Descriptive Statistics for Practitioners’ Regressions (ILBD & LBD) 
  Cosmetology 
Variables Mean  SD 
Practitioners/100,000 people 245.18 79.91 
Nonemployer Practitioners/100,000 people 177.72 69.54 
Median Annual Revenues (2010 $) 15,993 4,981 
Entry Rate (%) 24.87 15.99 
Exit Rate (%) 22.55 10.13 
Nonemployer Entry Rate (%) 26.59 17.23 
Nonemployer Exit Rate (%) 23.67 10.86 
Gap in Nonemployer Entrants’ Revenues* (2010 $) 4,334 8,283 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 15.92 2.71 
Population 100,087 337,417 
Population: Mean Personal Income (2010 $) 30,278 7,476 
Population: Males (%) 49.57 1.88 
Population: Caucasians (%) 88.01 15.16 
Population: African Americans (%) 8.67 13.89 
Population: Other Race (%) 3.32 6.86 
Population: Age 14 and Younger (%) 20.35 2.80 
Population: Age 15-64 (%) 64.28 3.51 
Population: Age 65 and Older (%) 15.37 4.10 
Population: At Least High School Diploma (%) 83.36 7.22 
Population: Unemployed (%) 5.64 2.60 
Geographic Area (Square Miles) 832 913 
Indicator for MSA Central County 0.1698 0.3755 
SBSI 40.22 6.96 
Number of States 32 
Number of Counties 2,055 
Number of Observations 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 
Notes: The observations are at the county-year level (2,055 counties times 15 years). * Gap in 
Nonemployer Entrants’ Revenues is defined as median annual revenues of an incumbent minus 
median annual revenues of an entrant. Hours Requirement varies only across states. At Least High 
School Diploma and Geographic Area variables vary only across counties. The SBSI index, which 
varies only across states, is designed to take into account major state-level costs imposed on 
businesses; the greater the value, the greater the costs. In the sample, the index ranges from 24.9 
(South Dakota) to 68.2 (D.C.).   
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Table 1.3 – Descriptive Statistics for Usual Hours of Work (ACS) 
Variables Mean  SD 
Weekly Hours Worked 33.61 11.78 
Employee: Age 41.30 13.75 
Employee: Age Squared 1894.40 1209.94 
Employee: Male (%) 8.26 27.53 
Employee: Caucasian (%) 80.38 39.71 
Employee: African American (%) 8.50 27.89 
Employee: Asian Race (%) 4.80 21.38 
Employee: Other Race (%) 6.31 24.32 
Employee: Hispanic (%) 12.16 32.68 
Employee: Less than 12 Grades (%) 6.06 23.85 
Employee: High School (%) 59.82 59.82 
Employee: Some College (%) 29.03 45.39 
Employee: College (%) 5.09 21.99 
Employee: Single (%) 22.53 41.78 
Employee: Married (%) 56.19 49.62 
Employee: Not Single or Married (%) 21.28 40.93 
Employee: At Least One Child (%) 46.49 49.88 
Employee: Naturalized Citizen (%) 10.14 30.19 
Employee: Not a Citizen (%) 6.10 23.93 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 14.53 2.55 
Population 14,675,684 11,058,579 
Population: Mean Personal Income (2010 $) 39,929 5,556 
Population: Males (%) 49.06 0.53 
Population: Caucasians (%) 79.41 7.62 
Population: African Americans (%) 13.19 7.62 
Population: Other Race (%) 7.40 4.93 
Population: 14 and Younger (%) 20.31 1.70 
Population: Age 15-64 (%) 66.88 1.06 
Population: 65 and Older (%) 12.81 1.94 
Population: At Least High School Diploma (%) 79.70 3.58 
Population: Unemployed (%) 6.21 2.28 
Geographic Area (Square Miles) 162,861 144,135 
SBSI 41.31 7.26 
Number of States 32 
Number of Observations 46,425 
Period 1999-2010 
Notes: The observations are at the state-year level. The sample contains only cosmetologists, based 
on the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), at least eighteen years old, with usual weekly 
hours of work greater than zero and not exceeding eighty, and personal income between $1,000 and 
$150,000 (2010 $). Hours Requirement, At Least High School Diploma, Geographic Area, and the 
SBSI variables vary only across states.  
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Table 1.4 – Descriptive Statistics for Prices of Cosmetology Services (COLI) 
  Cosmetology 
Variables Mean  SD 
Price (2010 $) 30.42 5.51 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 15.74 2.92 
Population 6,705,233 7,532,375 
Population: Mean Personal Income (2010 $) 36,702 7,044 
Population: Males (%) 48.94 0.66 
Population: Caucasians (%) 81.21 12.69 
Population: African Americans (%) 13.83 12.88 
Population: Other Race (%) 4.96 3.49 
Population: Age 14 and Younger (%) 20.62 1.92 
Population: Age 15-64 (%) 66.37 1.56 
Population: Age 65 and Older (%) 13.02 1.70 
Population: At Least High School Diploma (%) 80.72 4.43 
Population: Unemployed (%) 5.08 1.60 
Geographic Area (Square Miles) 114,619 103,931 
SBSI 42.21 8.21 
Number of States 32 
Number of Observations 454 
Period 1995-2009 
Notes: Price refers to the price for women’s cut and shampoo blow-dry. Observations are at the 
state-year level. As price data are missing for some state-years, the number of observations is 
smaller than 480 (32 states times 15 years). Hours Requirement, At Least High School Diploma, 
Geographic Area, and the SBSI variables vary only across states.  
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Table 1.5 – Descriptive Statistics for Analyses of Providers of Occupational 
Training (LBD) 
Providers of Occupational Training 
Variables Mean  SD 
Instructors/100,000 people 4.79 2.63 
Instructors’ Median Wage (2010 $) 23,774 4,715 
Number of School Establishments 32.61 31.97 
School Establishment Size (Instructors) 8.91 3.11 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 15.67 2.86 
Population 6,464,328 7,416,688 
Population: Mean Personal Income (2010 $) 36,754 6,949 
Population: Males (%) 48.92 0.65 
Population: Caucasians (%) 81.83 12.69 
Population: African Americans (%) 13.31 12.76 
Population: Other Race (%) 4.86 3.43 
Population: Age 14 and Younger (%) 20.56 1.89 
Population: Age 15-64 (%) 66.37 1.54 
Population: Age 65 and Older (%) 13.06 1.68 
Population: At Least High School Diploma (%) 80.86 4.42 
Population: Unemployed (%) 5.05 1.57 
Geographic Area (Square Miles) 110,128 102,983 
SBSI 42.55 8.31 
Number of States 32 
Number of Observations 480 
Period 1995-2009 
Notes: The observations are at the state-year level (32 states times 15 years). Hours Requirement, 
At Least High School Diploma, Geographic Area, and the SBSI variables vary only across states. 
The At Least High School Diploma variable is from the Decennial Census of 2000.  
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Table 1.6 – OLS Regression Results: Number of Practitioners per Capita 
  Log(Practitioners/Capita) Log(Nonemp. Pract./Capita) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.002 -0.003 0.013 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year  Yes No Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 30,825 30,825 30,825 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the county-year level. All regressions include the 
following set of control variables: log of per capita mean personal income, log of geographic area, 
fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other than African 
American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 
and older, fraction of population with at least a high school diploma, unemployment rate, SBSI 
index, and an indicator for central counties of the Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
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Table 1.7 – OLS Regression Results: Weekly Hours Worked  
  Log(Weekly Hours Worked) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.007 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.034) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes 
Number of Observations 46,425 46,425 
Period 1999-2010 1999-2010 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. All regressions contain employee-level variables shown in Table 1.3 that 
control for age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, marital status, presence of children, and 
citizenship. The regressions also include the following state-level controls: log of population, log 
of per capita mean personal income, log of geographic area, fraction of males, fraction of African 
Americans, fraction of population other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of 
population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of population 
with at least a high school diploma, unemployment rate, and SBSI index.  
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Table 1.8 – OLS Regression Results: Prices of Cosmetology Services 
  Log(Price) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) -0.005 0.0005 
  (0.006) (0.0078) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes 
Number of Observations 454 454 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Price is the price for women’s cut and shampoo blow-dry and is from the 
Cost of Living Index (COLI) data published by the Council for Community and Economic 
Research (C2ER). Observations are at the state-year level. As price data are missing for some 
state-years, the number of observations is smaller than 480 (32 states times 15 years). All 
regressions include the following set of control variables: log of population, log of per capita mean 
personal income, log of geographic area, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction 
of population other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and 
younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of population with at least a high school 
diploma, unemployment rate, and SBSI index.  
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Table 1.9 – OLS Regression Results: Median Annual Revenues 
 Log(Median Annual Revenues) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.009* -0.010* 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year  Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes 
Number of Observations 30,825 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the county-year level. The dependent variable is a 
logarithm of median annual revenues of nonemployer practitioners in a market in a given year. All 
regressions include the following set of control variables: log of per capita mean personal income, 
log of geographic area, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population 
other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of 
population age 65 and older, fraction of population with at least a high school diploma, 
unemployment rate, SBSI index, and an indicator for central counties of the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area.  
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Table 1.10 – OLS Regression Results: Entry and Exit Rates 
  Entry Rate (%) Nonemployers’ Entry Rate (%) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) -0.141 -0.500*** -0.154 -0.636*** 
  (0.159) (0.122) (0.218) (0.193) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes No Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 30,825 30,825 30,825 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
  Exit Rate (%) Nonemployers’ Exit Rate (%) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) -0.129 -0.408*** -0.259 -0.522*** 
  (0.123) (0.084) (0.176) (0.133) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes No Yes No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 30,825 30,825 30,825 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the county-year level. All regressions also include the 
log of lagged population, log of lagged per capita mean personal income, log of geographic area, 
lagged fraction of males, lagged fraction of African Americans, lagged fraction of population other 
than African American or Caucasian, lagged fraction of population age 14 and younger, lagged 
fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of population with at a least high school diploma, 
unemployment rate, SBSI index, and an indicator for central counties of the Metropolitan Statistical 
Area.  
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Table 1.11 – OLS Regression Results: Gap in Entrants’ Revenues† 
  Gap in Entrants’ Revenues 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 23.9 -181.9*** 
  (62.9) (44.0) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year No No 
Fixed Effects – Year  Division No Yes 
Number of Observations 30,825 30,825 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: † Gap in Entrants’ Revenues is defined as median annual revenues of a nonemployer 
incumbent minus median annual revenues of a nonemployer entrant. Standard errors are clustered 
by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations 
are at the county-year level. All regressions include the following set of control variables: log of 
population, log of per capita mean personal income, log of geographic area, fraction of males, 
fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other than African American or Caucasian, 
fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of 
population with at least a high school diploma, unemployment rate, SBSI index, and an indicator 
for central counties of the Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
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Table 1.12 – OLS Regression Results: Instructors 
  Log(Instructors/Capita) Log(Instructors’ Median Wage) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.0009 -0.004 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.0068) (0.006) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 480 480 480 480 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the state-year level. All regressions include year fixed 
effects and the following set of control variables: log of per capita mean personal income, log of 
geographic area, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other 
than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of 
population age 65 and older, fraction of population with at least a high school diploma, 
unemployment rate, and SBSI index. Instructors’ Median Wage regressions also include log of 
population.  
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Table 1.13 – OLS Regression Results: Schools 
  Log(Number of School Establishments) Log(School Establishment Size) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.006 -0.014 0.049*** 0.063*** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 480 480 480 480 
Period 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the state-year level. All regressions include year fixed 
effects and the following set of control variables: log of population, log of per capita mean 
personal income, log of geographic area, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction 
of population other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and 
younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of population with at a least high school 
diploma, unemployment rate, and SBSI index. School Establishment Size is defined as the state-
year median size of a school establishment in terms of number of instructors.  
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Table 1.14 – OLS Regression Results: School Revenues and Margins 
  Log(Avg. Revenues of School Establishments) 
Log(Avg. Gross Margin of 
School Est.) 
Hours Requirement (in 100s) 0.092*** 0.207*** 0.101*** 0.203*** 
  (0.032) (0.064) (0.028) (0.066) 
Fixed Effects – Division No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 25 25 25 25 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Regression data are from states with stable required hours of training 
for cosmetologists for which the U.S. Census Bureau provides publicly available information 
based on the Economic Census of 2002, namely: Arkansas, California, D.C., Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. Subject to data constraints, Average Gross Margin 
of School Establishment is defined as annual state training school revenues minus state annual 
payroll divided by the number of school establishments in the state. All regressions include the 
following set of state-level control variables: log of per capita mean personal income, log of 
population, log of geographic area, and SBSI index. With the full set of control variables, the 
coefficients are of similar magnitude, although in specifications with division fixed effect, due to 
lack of degree of freedom, the coefficients are no longer statistically significant.  
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Table 1.15 – OLS Regression Results: Explaining the Intensity of Occupational 
Licensing Regulation 
  Hours Requirement for Cosmetologists 
Specification A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Practitioners per Capita) 324.11*** 423.45*** 296.94 480.38** 
  (114.26) (136.97) (263.07) (189.92) 
Urbanization (%) -10.76*** -10.89*** -8.42** -10.97*** 
  (3.28) (2.92) (3.16) (2.66) 
Fixed Effects – Division No No No No 
Number of Observations 32 32 32 32 
Census Data from Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Specification B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Practitioners per Capita) 122.27 140.78 -149.98 -12.32 
  (129.23) (178.03) (298.13) (231.34) 
Urbanization (%) -3.93 -4.17 -0.55 -2.78 
  (3.95) (4.13) (4.29) (3.64) 
Fixed Effects – Division Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 32 32 32 32 
Census Data from Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The observations are states with stable licensing requirements per 
Section 1.4.1. Because the Census did not separate the two in the relevant periods, I include as 
practitioners both barbers and hairdressers.  
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Figure 1.1 – Cosmetology Training Hours Requirements (2010) 
 
Figure 1.2 – Robustness Checks: Extended Set of States (2010) 
 
Notes: As robustness checks, I use an extended set of 44 states (including Alaska with 1,650 
hours, not depicted) that did not have a change in hours regulation in the 1993-2010 period and 
do not have multiple licensing categories (except for Georgia, in which cosmetology and hair 
stylist categories differ by only 175 hours).  
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Appendix 1.A – Cosmetology Training Hours Requirements in 2010 
    State Cosmetology Hours State Cosmetology Hours 
Alabama2 1,500 Montana1,2 2,000 
Alaska2 1,650 Nebraska1,2 2,100 
Arizona2 1,600 Nevada 1,800* 
Arkansas1,2 1,500 New Hampshire1,2 1,500 
California1,2 1,600 New Jersey1,2 1,200 
Colorado 1,800* New Mexico2 1,600 
Connecticut2 1,500 New York1,2 1,000 
Delaware1,2 1,500 North Carolina1,2 1,500 
D.C. 1,2 1,500  North Dakota1,2 1,800 
Florida1,2 1,200 Ohio 1,500* 
Georgia2 1,500* Oklahoma1,2 1,500 
Hawaii 1,800* Oregon 1,700 
Idaho 2,000* Pennsylvania1,2 1,250 
Illinois1,2 1,500 Rhode Island1,2 1,500 
Indiana1,2 1,500 South Carolina1,2 1,500 
Iowa1,2 2,100 South Dakota1,2 2,100 
Kansas1,2 1,500 Tennessee1,2 1,500 
Kentucky1,2 1,800 Texas1,2 1,500 
Louisiana1,2 1,500 Utah1,2 2,000 
Maine1,2 1,500 Vermont2 1,500 
Maryland1,2 1,500 Virginia2 1,500 
Massachusetts1,2 1,000 Washington2 1,600 
Michigan1,2 1,500 West Virginia1,2 2,000 
Minnesota2 1,550 Wisconsin2 1,800 
Mississippi1,2 1,500 Wyoming 2,000* 
Missouri2 1,500 Mean 1,599 
1 Indicates the 32 states in the contiguous United States with no documented change in the cosmetology training 
hours requirement from 1981 to 2010 and no multiple cosmetology categories. The states are depicted in Figure 1.1. 
2 Indicates the 44 states with no documented change in the cosmetology training hours requirement from 1993 to 
2010 and no multiple cosmetology categories. The states are depicted in Figure 1.2. 
* Indicates cases with an alternative category of cosmetology professional that has a somewhat different title and 
different training hours requirement (for instance, Cosmetologists and Hair Designers in Ohio, with requirements of 
1,500 and 1,200 hours, respectively).  
Source: Cosmetology requirements are based on 2010 Endorsement Report of the National-Interstate Council of 
State Boards of Cosmetology and my own compilations. Thanks to Morris Kleiner, I also have cosmetology 
regulation data for several years since 1981. Additionally, I used cosmetology regulations in Bianco (1993).  
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Appendix 1.B – List of Dependent Variables and Sources 
Dependent Variable Variation Data Source 
Practitioners 
Practitioners per Capita County-Year ILBD & LBD, Census 
Nonemployer Practitioners per Capita County-Year ILBD, Census 
Weekly Hours Worked Individual ACS 
Price State-Year COLI 
Median Annual Revenues County-Year ILBD 
Entry Rate County-Year ILBD & LBD 
Exit Rate County-Year ILBD & LBD 
Nonemployer Entry Rate County-Year ILBD 
Nonemployer Exit Rate County-Year ILBD 
Gap in Entrants’ Revenues County-Year ILBD 
Providers of Occupational Training 
Instructors per Capita State-Year LBD, Census 
Instructors’ Median Wage State-Year LBD 
Number of School Establishments State-Year LBD 
School Establishment Size State-Year LBD 
Avg. Revenues per School Establishment State EC 2002 
Avg. Gross Margin per School Establishment State EC 2002 
Notes: ILBD stands for Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (a confidential data set from 
the U.S. Census Bureau), LBD for Longitudinal Business Database (a confidential data set from 
the U.S. Census Bureau), Census for population data (a publicly available data set from the U.S. 
Census Bureau), ACS for the American Community Survey (a publicly available data set from the 
U.S. Census Bureau), COLI for the Cost of Living Index (a proprietary data set from the Council 
for Community and Economic Research), and EC 2002 for the Economic Census of 2002 (a 
publicly available version of the data from the U.S. Census Bureau).  
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Appendix 1.C – OLS Regression Results: Explaining the Year of Adoption of 
Occupational Licensing Regulation 
  Cosmetology: Year of Adoption 
Specification A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Practitioners per Capita) -7.72** -9.40** -7.96 -10.60** 
  (3.17) (3.92) (5.02) (4.85) 
Urbanization (%) 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Fixed Effects – Division No No No No 
Number of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Census Data from Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Specification B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Practitioners per Capita) -0.15 1.89 4.68 5.87 
  (4.00) (6.09) (6.04) (8.71) 
Urbanization (%) -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Fixed Effects – Division Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Census Data from Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The observations are states with stable licensing requirements per 
Section 1.4.1 and known year of adoption of occupational licensing. Because the Census did not 
separate the two in the relevant periods, I include as practitioners both barbers and hairdressers. 
  
48 
 
Appendix 1.D – Descriptive Statistics of States 
Cosmetologists 
Regulation Intensity 
Excluded 
Low Medium High 
Hours Requirement 1,130 1,505 1,988 / 
Population Personal Income per Capita (2010 $) 44,528 38,244 34,172 38,745 
SBSI* 42.95 42.53 42.32 42.49 
Price (2010 $) 34.26 32.92 26.35 31.29 
Practitioners/100,000 people** 349.71 339.76 317.00 313.93 
Weekly Hours Worked*** 34.27 34.66 34.29 34.33 
Age*** 40.11 39.62 38.27 39.08 
Number of States 5 19 8 19 
Notes: Low hours requirement states are those with fewer than 1,500 hundred hours required, 
medium hours requirement states those with 1,500 hundred to less than 1,800 hours required, and 
high hours requirement states those with 1,800 hours or greater required. “Excluded” denotes 
states excluded from the analyses, mostly because of changes in their hours requirement over the 
1981-2010 period. * The SBSI index, which varies only across states, is designed to take into 
account major state-level costs imposed on businesses; the greater the value, the greater the costs. 
In the sample, the index ranges from 24.9 (South Dakota) to 68.2 (D.C.). ** Calculated from the 
County Business Patterns and Nonemployer Statistics for 1999-2010. *** Averaged over 
cosmetologists in the ACS data.  
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Appendix 1.E – OLS Regression Results: Excluded States 
 Indicator for Excluded States 
  Cosmetology 
Log(Practitioners per Capita) -0.411 
  (0.293) 
Log(Price) (2010 $) -0.046 
  (0.458) 
Log(Mean Personal Income) (2010 $) -0.311 
  (0.823) 
Log (Population) 0.473 
  (0.345) 
Population: Males (Fraction) 8.782 
  (26.254) 
Population: African Americans (Fraction) -0.121 
  (0.805) 
Population: Other Race (Fraction) 0.369 
  (0.762) 
Population: Age 14 and Younger (Fraction) -9.722 
  (7.331) 
Population: Age 65 and Older (Fraction) -9.633 
  (5.978) 
Population: At Least High School Diploma (Fraction) 3.576 
  (2.192) 
Population: Unemployed (Fraction) 0.170 
  (1.702) 
Geographic Area (Square Miles) 0.022 
  (0.121) 
SBSI 0.001 
  (0.009) 
Number of Observations 638 
Period 1998-2010 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. The dependent variable is an indicator denoting 19 states that were 
excluded from the analyses, mostly because of changes in their licensing regulation. The 
demographic variables describe a state population. Price information not having been collected for 
some years in some states, the number of observations is smaller than 663 (13 years times 50 states 
and D.C.). 
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CHAPTER 2 
SURVIVAL PROSPECTS OF FRANCHISED AND INDEPENDENTLY OWNED 
BUSINESSES: A NEW LOOK†
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The International Franchise Association (IFA), numerous individual franchisors, and the trade 
press have for decades maintained that the failure rate of individual franchised businesses is far 
below the high rates of failure of independent firms generally. The IFA’s position is reflected in 
the following excerpt from its critique of the CNBC Documentary, “Behind the Counter: The 
Untold Story of Franchising.” 
According to the U.S Small Business Administration, seven out of 10 new employer 
firms survive only 2 years, half at least 5 years, a third at least 10 years, and a quarter 
stay in business 15 years or more. […] According to previous research conducted by 
the IFA Educational Foundation, more than 90 percent of franchisees renew their 
agreements at the end of their contracts. On an annualized basis, approximately 5-6 
percent of the franchisees that come up for renewal are terminated (not renewed), and 
approximately 2-3 percent are transferred to another owner (this may be due to a 
retirement, a death of the previous owner, or a multitude of other factors that have 
nothing to do with whether or not the business was “successful”). 
                                                 
† This essay represents joint work with Francine Lafontaine of the University of Michigan.   
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The tone of the IFA’s message, and statistics emphasized within it, suggest that 
franchises are much less risky than independent businesses. But when failure rates of franchised 
businesses overall, not just the subset of failure attributable to terminations and non-renewals in 
franchised chains, are compared with those of independent businesses, the evidence is mixed. 
Bates (1995a, b), for example, documented that 38 percent of franchised, versus 32 percent of 
non-franchised, small businesses started in 1986-1987 were no longer operating in late 1991. In 
other words, the failure rate of franchised businesses is greater, and that of independent 
businesses much lower, than suggested by industry insiders. 
In theory, starting a business as a franchise should be less risky than launching an 
independent business because franchisees benefit from franchisors’ reputation and know-how 
and may realize cost savings from more efficient supply chains and bulk purchasing. That 
franchised establishments have become a ubiquitous part of modern day life suggests that 
business owners value these benefits.30
This essay revisits the question of franchise versus independent business performance 
measured in terms of survival rates. We also explore whether state franchise relationship 
regulations aimed at preventing franchisor opportunism increase the survival of franchised 
businesses. Our analyses exploit newly available U.S. Census Bureau data from the Survey of 
 Independent business owners, however, do not have to 
pay franchising fees including royalties on revenues, and retain complete autonomy, allowing 
them to adapt as needed to changing market conditions. This latter capacity suggests a potential 
for superior performance by non-franchised businesses.  
                                                 
30 Franchise information collected from more than 4.3 million establishments by the U.S. Census Bureau in the 
Economic Census Franchise Statistics for 2007 document that franchise establishments represented 10.5 percent of 
employer establishments and employed 7.9 million people. The majority of establishments in franchise chains (77.4 
percent) were franchisee-owned. For an industry breakdown of these data see, for instance, Kosová and 
Lafontaine (2012). 
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Business Owners (SBO) that includes a question about whether or not a business is franchised. 
The SBO was started in 2002 and is currently available also for the year 2007. We use the 
comprehensive Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Census Bureau to determine 
survival status for the first few years in business. To limit differences in survival rates 
documented for repeat business owners (see, notably, Bates, 1998 for franchise business owners 
and Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013 for business owners generally), we focus on single-
establishment businesses, whether franchised or independent. We find that in simple mean 
comparisons, the one-year survival rate is about six percentage points higher for franchised than 
for independent businesses. The difference in the two-year survival rate is even greater at nine to 
ten percentage points. Controlling for the many factors that may lead an individual to pursue a 
franchise rather than open an independent business reduces the difference in survival rate 
slightly, to about five percentage points for the one-year survival rate. Although this gap persists 
for the two-year and three-year survival rates, we do not find, conditional on having survived one 
year, any survival advantage for franchised businesses. Franchised businesses from the 2002 
cohort that survived to 2003, for instance, have no survival advantage over the set of independent 
businesses that also survived to that point. Its absence after the first year suggests that the 
conditional survival advantage of franchised businesses is not a function of franchisers’ selection 
of higher ability applicants relative to market selection in the case of independent businesses. We 
would expect franchisor selection of higher ability individuals to be reflected in a survival 
advantage for franchised businesses that persists beyond their initial years. That it does not leads 
us to suspect that the higher survival rate in the initial years is perhaps best explained by 
franchisor provided know-how. 
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The essay is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we briefly review the relevant literature 
and describe state franchising regulations. Details pertaining to the data are provided in 
Section 2.3. We present our empirical approach in Section 2.4, and our results in Section 2.5. 
Concluding remarks are offered in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Literature 
Bates’s (1995a, b) finding that survival prospects are better for independent than for franchised 
businesses runs counter to commonly held beliefs. Although his study used the best data 
available at the time—the Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) dataset from 1987, 
predecessor of the Survey of Business Owners (SBO) used in this study—the small sample size 
and persistent claims that franchising is much safer than independent business ownership suggest 
that the question warrants renewed consideration.  
The decision to open a franchised rather than an independent business being non random, 
one must find a way to control for “selection into franchising” in order to ascertain whether 
franchising has any direct effect on survival (see, for example, Kosová, Lafontaine, and Perrigot, 
2013 on the issue of comparing other outcomes of interest between franchised and non-
franchised businesses). Evidence that selection into franchising is not random is variously 
provided by Williams (1998), Kaufmann (1999), and Mazzeo (2004). Williams (1998) shows 
such characteristics of business owners as education, managerial experience, and experience as a 
salaried worker to increase the likelihood of an entrepreneur entering into a franchise 
relationship. Kaufmann (1999) finds evidence that entrepreneurs are more likely to open 
franchise businesses in sectors of business activity with which they are unfamiliar, and 
independent businesses in sectors with which they are familiar. Mazzeo (2004), analyzing the 
motel industry, finds heterogeneity in the underlying economic environment to affect the 
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likelihood of affiliation. Motels located near interstate highway exits and in markets with greater 
volumes of traffic and higher uncertainty, for example, are more likely to be franchised. Our 
findings on the probability of starting franchise relative to independent businesses are in line 
with this literature. 
 Klick, Kobayashi, and Ribstein’s (2009) study of state franchise relationship laws find 
their impact on franchise activity to be negligible when parties are allowed to contract around the 
laws. The empirical evidence does not support the notion that franchise terminations are a 
manifestation of franchisor opportunism (Blair and Lafontaine, 2005). 
2.3 Data 
Whether a business is franchised or independent is identified in the Survey of Business Owners 
(SBO), a confidential U.S. Census Bureau survey first conducted in 2002. The Census’s attempt 
to obtain information on more than 2.2 million businesses (and their owners) yielded a response 
rate of 75 percent for the SBO 2002 and 62 percent for the SBO 2007.31
                                                 
31 The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) database used by Bates (1995a, b, 1998) and Williams (1998) was 
the precursor of the SBO. The CBO sample was much smaller, however. 
 The SBO universe 
includes all nonfarm businesses with annual receipts of at least $1,000 that filed Internal 
Revenue Service tax forms as individual proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations. The 
survey is conducted every five years, together with the Economic Census. At the time of this 
study, data collected in this survey were available only for the years 2002 and 2007 (data 
collected in the 2012 survey having not yet been released). The SBO collects information on the 
characteristics of both businesses (e.g., industrial sector of operation, legal form of organization, 
and franchise status) and business owners (e.g., gender, race, age, and education). These 
variables enable us not only to examine the effect of owner characteristics on survival directly, 
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but, more important, to control for differences between owners of franchised and independent 
businesses. Because many of the characteristics that predict business survival likely influence as 
well the decision to buy a franchise or start an independent business, were we not to control for 
them in our survival analyses our coefficient of interest, on the effect of franchising, would likely 
be biased upwards. This could lead us to conclude that survival is positively affected by 
franchising when it is actually caused by differences in the characteristics of the business 
owners. We return to this issue in the econometric specification section. 
Another confidential U.S. Census Bureau dataset, the Longitudinal Business Database 
(LBD), provides annual information on all private sector employer establishments in the United 
States. A subset of all business establishments, employer establishments include only businesses 
with a payroll.32
To avoid the systematic survivorship bias that characterizes firms founded earlier (to 
appear in the surveys, firms have to have survived up to the survey year), we focus on single-
establishment businesses started in the years to which the SBO relates, that is, 2002 and 2007. 
This restriction gives us 158,600 businesses in the 2002, and 96,700 businesses in the 2007, 
wave.
 Although most businesses in the United States do not have employees, we focus 
on employer businesses because most economic activity occurs through them. Merging the LBD 
with the SBO based on unique business establishment identifiers (the match was quite high at 
98.2 percent for 2002, and 98.8 percent for 2007) enables us to measure the survival of employer 
businesses surveyed in the SBO. 
33
                                                 
32 Information on construction of the LBD can be found in Jarmin and Miranda (2002). 
 As the proportion of franchise relative to independent businesses that survive for any 
period of time may (as data below suggest) be different, conclusions based on subsets of 
businesses that have survived up to a certain point could introduce a bias in our analyses. 
33 To satisfy U.S. Census Bureau disclosure procedures, all counts are rounded to hundreds. 
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Moreover, we consider only privately owned businesses in which the main owner had at 
least a fifty percent stake. This restriction ensures that a business owner, whose characteristics 
we control for, has a significant influence on the business and its success. Being interested in for-
profit businesses, we also eliminate nonprofit establishments and those owned by an estate, a 
trust, or members of a club. Finally, our goal being to assess the success of franchised relative to 
independent businesses, we focus on sectors of activity in which franchising is a relevant option. 
We therefore limit our analyses to businesses that operate in industries with a non-negligible 
franchising presence. Defining this subset as industries in four-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) sectors in which at least three percent of businesses in our 
cleaned SBO sample are franchised yields 106 and 82 such industries for the 2002 and 2007 
samples, respectively. These sectors account for 92.7 percent of franchised companies in the 
2002, and 91.5 percent in the 2007, sample. Our findings are robust to using different cutoffs. 
The data and sample are further described in Appendix 2.A. The list of industries can be found in 
Appendix 2.B. Our final sample for the SBO 2002 and 2007 waves consists of 11,582 and 4,351 
observations, respectively. Consistent with the 10.5 percent of businesses identified as franchised 
in the 2007 Economic Census, we find in the final sample for the 2002 wave 11.9 percent, and in 
the final sample for the 2007 wave 11.6 percent, of businesses to be franchised.  
We create for each business a series of binary variables that indicate whether it was still 
operating t years after it was started. We run separate regressions for each survival duration up to 
three years after business startup. It is important to note that the LBD records a business sold to 
another owner as an exit and entry of a new business. Because small business owners who sell 
their businesses often receive, according to the trade press, far less than predicted future cash 
flows would warrant, business sales may well represent a type of failure, in which case our data 
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correctly capture the event of interest. If one believes that business sales should not be counted 
as business failures, how this would affect our results depends on whether the buying and selling 
of franchises relative to independent businesses exhibits systematic differences. Assuming for 
both types of businesses a similar pattern for this dimension, our descriptive statistics would 
underestimate to a similar degree the true survival rates of both types of businesses. Thus, the 
difference in survival rates between the two types of businesses would be correctly estimated, 
and the coefficient on our franchise indicator variable in regression analyses would be unbiased. 
If we expect franchises to be more likely than independent businesses to be bought and sold, if 
for no other reason than that the former are less likely than the latter to be substantially changed 
upon transfer of ownership, then the difference in survival rates, and coefficient on franchise 
status in our regressions, would be biased downwards.  
With this caveat, Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables broken down by 
franchise status and SBO wave. Our main dependent variables, rates of business survival, are 
higher for franchised startups. The one-year survival rate for the 2002 cohort is 97.4 percent for 
franchised, and 90.9 percent for independently owned, businesses, the two-year survival rate, 
89.1 and 80.0 percent, respectively. The three-year survival advantage of franchises over 
independent businesses is even greater, at more than 11 percentage points. This pattern generally 
holds as well for the 2007 cohort, although all survival rates are smaller, likely reflecting the fact 
that businesses started in 2007 were soon faced with a major economic downturn. 
Interesting demographic differences among owners include fewer female franchisees in 
both cohorts, fewer young (less than 34 years old) franchisees in the 2002 cohort, and higher 
levels of formal education among franchisees generally, individuals with bachelor’s and 
postgraduate degrees constituting 48.8 percent of franchised, and only 36.2 percent of 
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independent, business owners in 2002 (this difference is even greater for 2007). This latter 
pattern is in line with findings reported in Williams (1998). Franchised businesses are also more 
likely to be organized as corporations or partnerships and less likely to be operated from home, 
to be somewhat larger in terms of initial employment size, and to be more likely to use bank 
loans as a source of financing. We find no systematic differences in the characteristics of the 
counties in which the businesses are established. 
We consider in our analyses the impact of state franchise laws. Disclosure, registration, 
and relationship are three categories of laws governing franchising at the state level. The 
requirements of state disclosure laws being similar to the mandates of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Franchise Rule, and registration laws being unlikely to have a significant effect, 
we focus on the impact of the relationship laws that were put in place to allay franchisor 
opportunism. States with franchise relationship laws include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin (also see Appendix 2.C).34
2.4 Econometric Specification 
 We test for a 
relation between the presence of franchise relationship laws and the survival of franchised 
businesses. 
In Section 2.3, we discussed demographic differences between franchisees and independent 
business owners based on Table 2.1. To shed light on the differences in a regression framework, 
we estimate the probability of starting a business as a franchise instead of as an independent 
business using the following equation, 
                                                 
34 Because franchisors in those two states can terminate franchise agreements without good cause, we do not 
consider Mississippi and Missouri to have franchise relationship laws, although technically they do. 
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𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠 =  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠𝛼 + 𝜂𝑗𝑘  + 𝛿𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠 
where the subscript i identifies a business started in an SBO survey year (either 2002 or 2007), 
j indexes the business’s sector (4-digit NAICS), k indicates startup size category (0, 1-5, 6-20, or 
21-100 employees), and c indexes the county and s the state in which the business is located. The 
dependent variable Franchised is a binary variable equal to one if the business is a franchise, and 
zero otherwise. The X vector includes owner-, business-, and market-level variables. 
Specifically, we include indicators for business owner age, gender, race, and education, and 
whether the business is operated primarily from home. As Mazzeo (2004) finds heterogeneity in 
the economic environment to be correlated with the decision to affiliate (become a franchisee) or 
operate independently, we also include in our regressions several market-level (in this case 
county) characteristics, such as mean county personal income per capita and demographics, for 
the year in which the business was started. Lastly, to account for various common but 
unobserved constant factors within U.S. states and within sectors in businesses of similar initial 
employment, we include state fixed effects and industry fixed effects (4-digit NAICS) interacted 
with startup size. The fixed effects are denoted in our regression equation by δs and ηjk. The 
explanatory variables are elaborated in Appendix 2.A. 
When analyzing survival, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the business 
is still in operation t years later. We estimate the following equation, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠  + 𝛽𝑅𝑠𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠  + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠𝛾 + 𝜂𝑗𝑘  + 𝛿𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑠𝑡 
where, again, the subscript i identifies a business started in an SBO survey year (either 2002 or 
2007), j indexes its sector (4-digit NAICS), k indicates startup size category (0, 1-5, 6-20, or 21-
100 employees), and c indexes the county and s the state in which the business is located. 
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The main explanatory variable of interest is Franchised status, which indicates whether 
the business is operated as a franchise. To estimate the effect of state franchising laws, we 
include an interaction between franchised status and an indicator R for states with franchise 
relationship laws. The estimation exploits within-state variation between franchised and 
independent businesses, assuming only the former to be affected by state franchise relationship 
laws. 
The X vector again includes owner-, business-, and county-level control variables, 
specifically, indicators for business owners’ age, gender, race, and education as well as an 
indicator variables for the average number of hours worked in the business. These variables 
capture possible differences in performance among entrepreneurs of varying demographic 
characteristics, levels of education, and effort levels, some of which might also affect their 
decision to become a franchisee. For example, we find, as does Williams (1998), that more 
formally educated individuals are more likely to start a franchise than an independent business. 
Given this, and assuming that an owner’s human capital, often measured in terms of education 
level, affects business survival, a regression of business survival on a franchising indicator 
variable that did not include education among the regressors would yield upward-biased 
estimates of the effect of franchising. This is because the coefficient of the franchise indicator 
variable would capture not only the effect of franchising, but also the survival advantage that 
would accrue to greater human capital being applied to the business. Put differently, the absence 
of human capital (education) in a regression in which it should be included would yield a 
positive correlation between the error term (which would include the effect of the omitted 
variable, human capital) and the franchise indicator variable, thereby violating a central 
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assumption of the regression model and leading to (omitted variable) bias in the coefficient of 
interest. 
For similar reasons, we include indicator variables for legal form of organization, source 
of capital used to start the business, and whether the business is operated primarily from home, 
and is family owned (the latter coded based on a question that asks whether the majority of the 
business is owned by members of the same family). We control for the size of the business at 
startup by including the initial year employment level. We include in our regressions several 
market-level (in this case county) characteristics, such as mean county personal income per 
capita and demographics, in the year in which the business was started. As above, to account for 
various common but unobserved factors within U.S. states and within sectors in businesses of 
similar initial employment, all regressions also include state fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects (4-digit NAICS) interacted with startup size. 
We estimate the probability of survival separately for each SBO wave and each survival 
period (one, two, and three year survival) under a linear probability model. We also report 
conditional survival results, that is, the probability that a business survives for another year given 
that it has already survived for one or two years. Reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. 
2.5 Results 
As can be seen in Table 2.2, gender and race do not predict franchise status, but age and 
education do. Entrepreneurs aged 35 to 64 are more likely to become franchisees, the effect 
being stronger with age within this range. The probability also increases with formal education, 
individuals with bachelor’s or postgraduate degrees being around ten percentage points more 
likely to become franchisees relative to independent business owners. We also find franchises to 
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be less likely to be operated from home. The results do not show any pattern of systematic 
differences in the characteristics of the counties in which the businesses are established. 
The first three columns of Table 2.3 report coefficients for one-, two-, and three-year 
survival for businesses started in 2002. We find franchised businesses to have a 5.1 percentage 
point higher one-year survival rate than independent businesses. For the two- and three-year 
survival rates, the difference is somewhat greater at 5.9 and 7.2 percentage points, respectively. 
In columns 4 to 6, we report results for the cohort of businesses started in 2007, for which the 
survival advantage is similar at 4.9, 5.7, and 5.1 percentage points for one-, two-, and three-year 
survival, respectively. These differences in survival rates between the two modes of business 
startup are substantial relative to the means, given an initial one-year survival rate for businesses 
in our sample of 91.7 percent for the 2002, and 89.6 percent for the 2007, cohort (see Table 2.1), 
but somewhat lower than those reported in our descriptive statistics. This confirms the 
importance of controlling for factors that might affect the decision to become a franchisee in 
estimating the effect of franchising on survival. That state franchise relationship laws do not 
seem to have any effect on franchised businesses’ survival can be seen from row 2 in Table 2.3. 
Coefficients for the franchise relationship laws for the 2007 wave could not be disclosed due to 
U.S. Census Bureau restrictions, but qualitatively are not statistically different from zero.  
The results in Table 2.3 also show the businesses of African American owners to have 
lower, and those of Asian owners higher, probabilities of survival. Owner age is positively 
related to a business’s duration, and we find few significant effects of education, but striking 
negative effects of low effort. This being a decision variable for the business owner, it might be 
that owners put less effort into businesses that are not promising. In any case, the correlation 
between effort and survival is revealing. Similarly, we find in both cohorts businesses organized 
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as corporations (the omitted category) to have substantially greater survival rates than those 
organized as proprietorships or partnerships. This, too, might be capturing business owners’ level 
of dedication to their ventures. Finally, businesses financed at least partly via bank or 
government guaranteed loans have greater, and those financed via credit card lower, survival 
probabilities. This is not a surprising finding given the screening process involved in obtaining 
bank or government financing.  
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the conditional survival regressions in which we 
examine the effect of franchising and other business and owner characteristics on the probability 
that a business will survive another year given that it has already survived one (columns 1 and 3 
for the 2002 and 2007 cohorts, respectively) or two (columns 2 and 4) years. The results in this 
table do not show any pattern of systematic differences in one year survival between franchised 
businesses and independently owned businesses that survived one or two years. Nor to state 
franchise relationship laws affect the conditional survival of franchised businesses. 
Between the likelihood that the higher survival rate of franchised businesses is driven by 
transfer of franchisors’ know-how or capacity to recruit higher ability individuals, we believe 
know-how to be the more likely driver. Because high ability franchisees should enjoy 
persistently higher rates of survival than independent owners, but after surviving the first year 
franchised businesses’ rate of survival is no higher than that of independent businesses, we 
suspect know-how transfer to be particularly important in explaining the difference in survival 
between franchised and independent businesses.  
The results in Table 2.4 also show the lower survival probability of businesses of African 
American owners, and survival advantage of businesses of Asian owners, to persist even after 
conditioning on surviving for one, or for the 2007 cohort two, years. That the effects of owner 
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effort in the survey year also persist even after conditioning on both one and two year survival 
suggests that the initial-year effort might reveal something about owners’ attitudes towards work 
that helps their businesses survive later on. The greater survival of businesses organized as 
corporations (omitted category) relative to sole proprietorships and partnerships, and survival 
advantage of being financed by a bank loan or government guaranteed loan, are present as well 
after conditioning on one or two year survival. Being financed, at least in part, by credit card, on 
the other hand, lowers the conditional survival probability in both waves. Thus, unlike franchise 
status, which improves survival only in the first year and is not present conditionally, many of 
these factors have a recurrent effect on survival. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This essay provides evidence on relative survival rates of businesses started as franchises and 
independent businesses. We also explore whether state franchise relationship regulations aimed 
at preventing franchisor opportunism have positively affected the survival of franchised 
businesses. We find franchising to be a safer way to start a business, and the survival of 
franchised businesses not to be affected by franchise relationship laws.  
Some of the difference in survival rates in simple means reflects differences in the types 
of individuals who choose to start business of one form or the other. Controlling for such 
differences, which we showed to be essential in order to correctly identify the effect of 
franchising on survival, we find the difference in one-year survival to be five percentage points, 
a sizable effect given the mean one-year survival rate of 91.7 percent for all the businesses in our 
data. Franchised businesses are six to seven percentage points more likely than independent 
businesses to survive to three years, relative to an overall mean three-year survival rate of around 
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70 percent. These results are independent of whether we examine the sample of businesses 
started in 2002 or 2007.  
Our conditional survival results show franchises, independent of cohort, that survive for 
one year to do no better than independent businesses that survive the same length of time. We 
further conclude that the higher survival of franchises in the initial year is more likely driven by 
franchisor provided know-how than by franchisors’ initial selection of higher ability 
individuals.35
Our results also indicate such owner characteristics as age and race affect the survival 
probabilities of new businesses. We find owner effort and choice of organizational form, factors 
likely chosen based on owners’ assessment of the value of their businesses, to be related to 
survival as well. Lastly, firms started with more formal sources of capital (banks and government 
backed loans as opposed to credit cards) survive longer, on average.  
 
Our findings concerning the survival advantage of franchised businesses do not support 
claims of the magnitude of this advantage, in part, because many such statements underestimate 
the probability of survival of new independent businesses. Our results also differ from those of 
Bates (1995a, b) in that we do find franchising to be somewhat the safer of the two forms. We 
plan to incorporate to an even greater degree in future analyses consideration of the decision to 
franchise and how it relates to survival probabilities.  
                                                 
35 Of course, by the time a business has survived for one year the business concept and ability of the independent 
entrepreneur have also been selected by the market. In that sense, one could interpret the franchisor selection process 
to be equivalent in the first year to that provided by the market. 
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Means Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
 Dependent Variables All Franch. Indep. All Franch. Indep. 
One Year Survival (%) 91.71 97.38 90.88 89.60 94.85 88.89 
Two Year Survival (%) 81.25 89.14 80.08 77.23 85.86 76.06 
Three Year Survival (%) 71.48 81.20 70.05 67.83 74.86 66.88 
Owner-Level Variables All Franch. Indep. All Franch. Indep. 
Male (%) 67.34 70.35 66.89 64.66 72.00 63.66 
Female (%) 32.66 29.65 33.11 35.34 28.00 36.34 
Caucasian (%) 84.26 81.57 84.65 82.18 84.16 81.91 
African American (%) 2.09 2.89 1.97 2.72 2.82 2.70 
Asian (%) 12.36 13.83 12.14 14.13 12.49 14.36 
Other Race (%) 1.30 1.71 1.24 0.97 0.53 1.03 
Age: Younger than 25 (%) 2.48 1.53 2.63 2.08 1.03 2.22 
Age: 25-34 (%) 20.42 17.70 20.83 19.97 20.34 19.91 
Age: 35-44 (%) 35.04 37.29 34.70 29.86 31.69 34.64 
Age: 45-54 (%) 28.48 28.74 28.44 32.34 30.90 29.72 
Age: 55-64 (%) 11.18 12.97 10.92 12.52 14.69 12.23 
Age: 65 and Older (%) 2.39 1.77 2.48 3.23 1.35 3.48 
Less than High School (%) 4.02 2.83 4.20 4.15 1.23 4.55 
High School (%) 23.17 15.55 24.29 20.25 16.39 20.77 
Technical or Vocational School (%) 7.08 3.09 7.67 5.82 2.55 6.26 
Some College (%) 21.04 21.63 20.95 18.03 15.74 18.34 
Associate Degree (%)  6.85 8.08 6.67 7.29 4.34 7.69 
Bachelor’s Degree (%)  26.95 33.80 25.94 31.21 43.70 29.52 
Postgraduate Degree (%)  10.89 15.02 10.28 13.25 16.05 12.87 
Weekly Work: Less than 20 H. (%) 14.13 16.69 13.75 13.70 20.17 12.83 
Weekly Work: 20-39 Hours (%) 11.86 14.01 11.54 13.68 17.14 13.22 
Weekly Work: 40 Hours (%) 11.39 8.05 11.88 14.99 8.81 15.81 
Weekly Work: 41-59 Hours (%) 30.72 28.31 31.08 29.21 27.55 29.44 
Weekly Work: 60 H. or More (%) 31.91 32.94 31.75 28.42 26.33 28.70 
Business-Level Variables All Franch. Indep. All Franch. Indep. 
Franchise (%) 12.86 100.00 0.00 11.93 100.00 0.00 
Sole Proprietorship (%) 25.24 18.22 26.28 19.07 11.99 20.03 
Partnership (%) 17.01 19.26 16.68 22.20 26.74 21.59 
Corporation (%) 57.74 62.52 57.04 58.73 61.27 58.38 
Operated from Home (%) 20.49 8.63 22.24 22.46 9.25 24.25 
Family Owned (%) 37.77 46.06 36.54 33.81 51.22 31.45 
Initial Year Employment 0.99 1.67 0.90 1.04 1.77 0.94 
Observations 11,582 1,377 10,205 4,351 505 3,846 
(Continued on the next page)  
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Means Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
Business-Level Variables (cont.) All Franch. Indep. All Franch. Indep. 
Financing – Savings (%) 70.38 67.07 70.87 72.06 71.47 72.14 
Financing – Bank Loan (%) 24.56 40.24 22.24 20.42 33.52 18.64 
Financing – Personal Assets (%) 21.35 24.04 20.96 14.16 17.07 13.76 
Financing – Credit Card (%) 18.86 14.81 19.46 20.01 17.31 20.37 
Financing – Government Loan (%) 3.60 5.32 3.35 1.72 3.94 1.42 
Fin. – Govern. guaranteed Loan (%) 4.53 9.91 3.74 3.10 7.70 2.48 
Financing – Outside Investor (%) 5.70 4.61 5.87 N/A N/A N/A 
Financing – None Needed (%) 6.50 1.65 7.21 4.96 0.30 5.60 
Financing – Home Equity Loan (%) N/A N/A N/A 17.64 28.43 16.18 
Fin. – Loan from Family/Friends (%) N/A N/A N/A 6.43 7.23 6.32 
Financing – Venture Capital (%) N/A N/A N/A 0.30 0.97 0.21 
Financing – Grants (%) N/A N/A N/A 0.21 0.00 0.24 
Fin. – Other Sources of Cap. (%) N/A N/A N/A 3.76 4.32 3.68 
Financing – Do Not Know (%) N/A N/A N/A 2.21 1.53 2.30 
Market-Level Var. (Counties) All Franch. Indep. All Franch. Indep. 
Population* 928,768 906,924 931,993 1,009,438 850,651 1,030,956 
Personal Income* (Current $) 32,291 32,483 32,263 40,986 40,786 41,013 
Males (%) 49.19 49.16 49.19 49.17 49.09 49.18 
Females (%) 50.81 50.84 50.81 50.83 50.91 50.82 
Caucasian (%) 82.45 82.49 82.45 80.34 80.06 80.38 
African Americans (%) 11.10 11.27 11.07 11.88 12.64 11.78 
Other Race (%) 6.45 6.24 6.48 7.78 7.30 7.85 
Age: 14 and Younger (%) 20.79 21.10 20.74 20.04 20.41 19.99 
Age: 15-64 (%) 66.68 66.59 66.70 67.40 67.38 67.40 
Age: 65 and Older (%) 12.53 12.30 12.56 12.56 12.21 12.61 
At Least High School Degree (%) 86.31 86.58 86.27 86.30 86.79 86.24 
Unemployed (%) 5.70 5.70 5.70 4.51 4.42 4.52 
Geographic Area* (Square Miles) 1,316 1,336 1,313 1,406 1,272 1,425 
MSA Central County (%) 69.52 73.23 68.98 72.11 75.78 71.61 
MSA Outlying County (%) 7.79 7.54 7.82 7.82 9.16 7.64 
Observations 11,582 1,377 10,205 4,351 505 3,846 
Notes: * Population, personal income per capita, and geographic area are entered into the 
regressions in logs. Source: U.S. Census Bureau SBO 2002, SBO 2007, and LBD, weighted 
means. Variables unavailable in one of the SBO surveys are denoted by N/A. For more 
information on the variables, see Appendix 2.A.   
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Table 2.2 – Linear Probability Estimates for Starting a Business as a Franchise  
  Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
  Franchised Bus. Indicator Franchised Bus. Indicator 
Male  0.007 (0.007)  0.013 (0.011) 
African American 0.001 (0.020) -0.015 (0.028) 
Asian -0.016 (0.012) -0.031* (0.017) 
Other Race  0.034 (0.028)  ND ND 
Age: 25-34  0.019 (0.018)  0.044 (0.033) 
Age: 35-44  0.037** (0.018)  0.062* (0.032) 
Age: 45-54  0.040** (0.018)  0.058* (0.033) 
Age: 55-64  0.048** (0.019)  0.090*** (0.035) 
Age: 65 and Older  0.005 (0.024) 0.015 (0.039) 
High School  0.037*** (0.013)  0.030 (0.024) 
Technical or Vocational School  0.043*** (0.016)  0.008 (0.027) 
Some College  0.077*** (0.013)  0.051** (0.024) 
Associate Degree  0.095*** (0.017)  0.035 (0.026) 
Bachelor’s Degree  0.104*** (0.013)  0.088*** (0.024) 
Postgraduate Degree  0.119*** (0.016)  0.082*** (0.026) 
Operated from Home -0.062*** 0.007 -0.076*** (0.011) 
Log(Population)  0.011** (0.004) -0.0006 (0.0078) 
Log(Personal Income) (Current $)  0.004 (0.021)  0.044 (0.032) 
Males (%) -0.188 (0.356) -0.273 (0.571) 
African Americans (%) -0.027 (0.037) -0.003 (0.067) 
Other Race (%) -0.026 (0.078) -0.030 (0.096) 
Age: 14 and Younger (%)  0.460** (0.183)  0.498 (0.321) 
Age: 65 and Older (%) -0.0004 (0.1370)  0.115 (0.264) 
At Least High School Degree (%)  0.067 (0.096)  0.106 (0.148) 
Unemployed (%) -0.432 (0.341) -0.642 (0.737) 
Log(Geographic Area) (Sq. Miles) -0.006 (0.005)  0.010 (0.009) 
MSA Central County (%) -0.007 (0.011)  0.026 (0.020) 
MSA Outlying County (%) 0.002 (0.014) 0.013 (0.023) 
FE − Industry �  Startup Size Yes Yes 
FE − State Yes Yes 
Observations 11,582 4,351 
R-squared 0.146 0.168 
Notes: Coefficients included in the regressions that cannot be disclosed due to U.S. Census Bureau 
restrictions are denoted by ND (Not Disclosed). Owner-level omitted variables were Female, 
Caucasian, Age: Younger than 25, and Less than High School. As well as State fixed effects, the 
regressions include Industry (NAICS4) interacted with Startup Size (four bins: 0, 1-5, 6-20, 21-
100 employees) fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 2.3 – Linear Probability Estimates for Survival of Different Durations 
  Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
  Survived at Least Survived at Least 
  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
Franchised Bus. Indicator 0.051*** (0.007) 0.059*** (0.013) 0.072*** (0.016) 0.049*** (0.015) 0.057*** (0.025) 0.051* (0.029) 
Indic. for Franchised 
Bus. in Relat.-Law State  -0.018 (0.011) -0.011 (0.019) -0.012 (0.024) ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Male -0.010* (0.006) -0.013 (0.008) -0.004 (0.009) -0.006 (0.011) 0.007 (0.015) 0.015 (0.017) 
African American -0.053** (0.021) -0.105*** (0.028) -0.105*** (0.029) -0.069** (0.032) -0.123*** (0.041) -0.157*** (0.042) 
Asian 0.0008 (0.0091) 0.030** (0.013) 0.039** (0.015) 0.009 (0.016) 0.049** (0.022) 0.081*** (0.025) 
Other Race -0.001 (0.023) 0.029 (0.033) 0.021 (0.037) ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Age: 25-34 0.019 (0.021) 0.051* (0.029) 0.061* (0.031) -0.019 (0.038) 0.012 (0.053) 0.038 (0.059) 
Age: 35-44 0.027 (0.021) 0.067** (0.028) 0.090*** (0.031) -0.003 (0.038) 0.063 (0.052) 0.119** (0.058) 
Age: 45-54 0.028 (0.021) 0.078*** (0.028) 0.100*** (0.031) 0.007 (0.038) 0.061 (0.052) 0.103* (0.059) 
Age: 55-64 0.014 (0.022) 0.044 (0.030) 0.062* (0.033) -0.004 (0.039) 0.014 (0.054) 0.051 (0.061) 
Age: 65 and Older 0.052** (0.026) 0.076** (0.037) 0.085** (0.041) -0.074 (0.051) 0.024 (0.065) 0.106 (0.072) 
High School 0.014 (0.017) 0.028 (0.023) 0.011 (0.024) 0.032 (0.030) 0.035 (0.040) 0.028 (0.043) 
Tech. or Vocational Sch. 0.022 (0.019) 0.053** (0.026) 0.051* (0.028) 0.005 (0.036) 0.016 (0.047) -0.025 (0.051) 
Some College 0.009 (0.017) 0.024 (0.023) 0.004 (0.025) 0.016 (0.030) 0.026 (0.040) 0.019 (0.044) 
Associate Degree 0.013 (0.019) 0.035 (0.026) 0.014 (0.029) -0.011 (0.035) -0.018 (0.044) -0.009 (0.048) 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.020 (0.017) 0.052** (0.023) 0.043* (0.025) 0.031 (0.030) 0.042 (0.039) 0.044 (0.042) 
Postgraduate Degree 0.015 (0.018) 0.041* (0.024) 0.029 (0.026) 0.014 (0.032) 0.010 (0.042) 0.009 (0.045) 
Weekly Work: 20-39 H. 0.017 (0.011) 0.036** (0.015) 0.018 (0.017) 0.021 (0.019) 0.056** (0.025) 0.054** (0.027) 
Weekly Work: 40 Hours 0.051*** (0.011) 0.060*** (0.015) 0.072*** (0.016) 0.032* (0.019) 0.081*** (0.024) 0.108*** (0.027) 
Weekly Work: 41-59 H. 0.047*** (0.009) 0.091*** (0.012) 0.112*** (0.014) 0.027 (0.017) 0.077*** (0.022) 0.105*** (0.024) 
Weekly Work: 60+ Hours 0.043*** (0.009) 0.076*** (0.013) 0.090*** (0.014) 0.034** (0.017) 0.065*** (0.022) 0.117*** (0.024) 
Sole Proprietorship -0.066*** (0.009) -0.125*** (0.012) -0.163*** (0.013) -0.059*** (0.015) -0.108*** (0.020) -0.124*** (0.022) 
Partnership -0.016** (0.007) -0.042*** (0.010) -0.065*** (0.011) -0.044*** (0.012) -0.059*** (0.016) -0.072*** (0.018) 
Operated from Home -0.048*** (0.008) -0.058*** (0.011) -0.063*** (0.012) -0.073*** (0.015) -0.091*** (0.019) -0.106*** (0.020) 
Family Owned 0.008 (0.005) 0.002 (0.008) 0.011 (0.009) 0.017 (0.010) 0.023 (0.014) 0.013 (0.016) 
Initial Year Employment 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 
 (Continued on the next page)  
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Table 2.3 – Linear Probability Estimates for Survival of Different Durations (continued) 
  Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
  Survived at Least Survived at Least 
  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
Financing – Savings -0.002 (0.006) 0.005 (0.009) 0.009 (0.011) 0.008 (0.012) 0.022 (0.017) 0.030 (0.019) 
Financing – Bank Loan 0.025*** (0.006) 0.044*** (0.009) 0.045*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.012) 0.061*** (0.017) 0.068*** (0.019) 
Financing – Personal Assets 0.009 (0.006) 0.002 (0.009) -0.002 (0.011) 0.009 (0.013) -0.0001 (0.0191) -0.013 (0.022) 
Financing – Credit Card -0.005 (0.007) -0.025** (0.010) -0.042*** (0.011) -0.021 (0.013) -0.066*** (0.018) -0.086*** (0.020) 
Financing – Govern. Loan 0.003 (0.012) -0.007 (0.019) -0.022 (0.024) ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Fin. – Gov. Guaranteed Loan 0.027*** (0.009) 0.060*** (0.015) 0.082*** (0.018) ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Outside Investor 0.007 (0.011) 0.036** (0.015) 0.028 (0.018) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Financing – None Needed -0.0002 (0.0126) 0.0006 (0.0173) 0.014 (0.019) 0.002 (0.028) -0.010 (0.035) 0.031 (0.038) 
Fin. – Home Equity Loan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.022* (0.012) 0.034* (0.018) 0.031 (0.020) 
F. – Loan from Fam./Friends  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.032* (0.018) 0.053** (0.025) 0.070** (0.029) 
Financing – Venture Capital N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Grants N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Fin. – Other Sources of Cap. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.028 (0.022) 0.006 (0.035) 0.014 (0.038) 
Financing – Do Not Know  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND ND ND 
Controls – Market Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE – Industry ��Startup 
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE – State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,582 11,582 11,582 4,351 4,351 4,351 
R-squared 0.093 0.126 0.157 0.133 0.153 0.157 
Notes: Coefficients included in the regressions that cannot be disclosed due to U.S. Census Bureau restrictions are denoted by ND (Not 
Disclosed). Variables unavailable in one of the SBO surveys are denoted by N/A. The regressions include the following set of market-level 
control variables: log of population, log of personal income per capita, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population 
other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, fraction of 
population with at a least high school degree, unemployment rates, SBSI index, and indicator variables for central and outlying counties of the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. As well as State fixed effects, the regressions include Industry (NAICS4) interacted with Startup Size (four bins: 
0, 1-5, 6-20, 21-100 employees) fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Reported standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 2.4 – Linear Probability Estimates, Conditional Survival 
  Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
  One Year Survival Conditional on Having Survived One Year Survival Conditional on Having Survived 
  1 Year 2 Years 1 Year 2 Years 
Franchised Business Indicator 0.017 (0.012) 0.025* (0.013) 0.017 (0.024) 0.006 (0.025) 
Indicator for Franchised Bus. in 
Relationship-Law State 0.003 (0.018) -0.007 (0.019) ND ND ND ND 
Male -0.005 (0.007) 0.006 (0.008) 0.015 (0.014) 0.010 (0.015) 
African American -0.069*** (0.026) -0.026 (0.026) -0.082** (0.039) -0.095** (0.043) 
Asian 0.031*** (0.011) 0.016 (0.013) 0.042** (0.019) 0.049** (0.019) 
Other Race 0.036 (0.027) -0.003 (0.031) ND ND ND ND 
Age: 25-34 0.040 (0.027) 0.031 (0.030) 0.032 (0.050) 0.033 (0.057) 
Age: 35-44 0.050* (0.026) 0.049* (0.030) 0.077 (0.049) 0.086 (0.056) 
Age: 45-54 0.060** (0.027) 0.050* (0.030) 0.065 (0.049) 0.069 (0.057) 
Age: 55-64 0.038 (0.028) 0.039 (0.031) 0.018 (0.051) 0.049 (0.059) 
Age: 65 and Older 0.040 (0.034) 0.037 (0.038) 0.104* (0.059) 0.120* (0.067) 
High School 0.023 (0.021) -0.011 (0.021) 0.010 (0.035) -0.008 (0.033) 
Technical or Vocational School 0.045* (0.023) 0.012 (0.023) 0.016 (0.041) -0.057 (0.044) 
Some College 0.022 (0.021) -0.017 (0.022) 0.016 (0.036) -0.012 (0.034) 
Associate Degree 0.031 (0.024) -0.012 (0.025) -0.008 (0.039) 0.004 (0.037) 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.043** (0.021) 0.002 (0.021) 0.023 (0.035) 0.007 (0.033) 
Postgraduate Degree 0.037* (0.022) -0.004 (0.023) -0.001 (0.038) -0.003 (0.036) 
Weekly Work: 20-39 Hours 0.024* (0.013) -0.013 (0.015) 0.041* (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) 
Weekly Work: 40 Hours 0.019 (0.013) 0.026* (0.014) 0.061*** (0.022) 0.058** (0.025) 
Weekly Work: 41-59 Hours 0.056*** (0.011) 0.044*** (0.012) 0.065*** (0.020) 0.061*** (0.022) 
Weekly Work: 60 Hours or More 0.044*** (0.011) 0.033*** (0.012) 0.045** (0.021) 0.087*** (0.022) 
Sole Proprietorship -0.077*** (0.011) -0.075*** (0.012) -0.065*** (0.018) -0.038** (0.019) 
Partnership -0.031*** (0.009) -0.034*** (0.009) -0.027* (0.015) -0.030* (0.016) 
Operated from Home -0.023** (0.009) -0.020** (0.010) -0.038** (0.017) -0.040** (0.019) 
Family Owned -0.004 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007) 0.011 (0.013) -0.012 (0.014) 
Initial Year Employment  -0.0003 (0.0013) 0.0009 (0.0018) 0.004** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 (Continued on the next page)  
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Table 2.4 – Linear Probability Estimates, Conditional Survival (continued) 
  Businesses Started in 2002 Businesses Started in 2007 
  One Year Survival Conditional on Having Survived One Year Survival Conditional on Having Survived 
  1 Year 2 Years 1 Year 2 Years 
Financing – Savings 0.010 (0.008) 0.007 (0.009) 0.017 (0.015) 0.013 (0.016) 
Financing – Bank Loan 0.025*** (0.007) 0.012 (0.009) 0.030** (0.015) 0.022 (0.016) 
Financing – Personal Assets -0.005 (0.008) -0.004 (0.009) -0.007 (0.017) -0.016 (0.018) 
Financing – Credit Card -0.023*** (0.009) -0.027*** (0.010) -0.054*** (0.016) -0.038** (0.018) 
Financing – Government Loan -0.010 (0.017) -0.014 (0.020) ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Gov. Guaranteed Loan 0.037*** (0.014) 0.032** (0.015) ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Outside Investor 0.033*** (0.012) -0.0008 (0.0150) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Financing – None Needed 0.003 (0.015) 0.020 (0.016) -0.016 (0.033) 0.050 (0.032) 
Financing – Home Equity Loan N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.014 (0.016) 0.005 (0.017) 
Financing – Loan from Family/Friends  N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.030 (0.023) 0.035 (0.023) 
Financing – Venture Capital N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Grants N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND 
Financing – Other Sources of Capital N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.015 (0.032) 0.010 (0.032) 
Financing – Do Not Know  N/A N/A N/A N/A ND ND ND ND 
Controls – Market Level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE – Industry �  Startup Size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE – State Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,650 9,435 3,876 3,343 
R-squared 0.086 0.101 0.120 0.129 
Notes: Coefficients included in the regressions that cannot be disclosed due to U.S. Census Bureau restrictions are denoted by ND (Not 
Disclosed). The coefficients of variables unavailable in one of the SBO surveys are denoted by N/A. The regressions include the following set of 
market-level control variables: log of population, log of personal income per capita, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of 
population other than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, 
fraction of population with at a least high school degree, unemployment rates, SBSI index, and indicator variables for central and outlying 
counties of the Metropolitan Statistical Area. As well as State fixed effects, the regressions include Industry (NAICS4) interacted with Startup 
Size (four bins: 0, 1-5, 6-20, 21-100 employees) fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Reported standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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Appendix 2.A – Data 
We focus on single-establishment businesses started in the years to which the Survey of Business 
Owners (SBO) pertains, namely, 2002 and 2007. We identify the starting and ending years of a 
business’s existence by means of the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which tracks all 
businesses over time, and the SBO, which identifies when a business was originally established. 
Our sample is restricted to for profit, neither publicly held nor owned by another organization 
including trust, estate, or members of a club or cooperative, businesses organized as 
proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations with a startup year number of employees not 
exceeding one hundred. We also require that businesses not have been established for a one-time 
event and not be of a seasonal or occasional nature, and that the main owner holds at least a fifty 
percent share and works in the business. We exclude businesses owned by Alaska Native or 
American Indian tribal entities, businesses sold to another party by the time the survey was 
conducted, and businesses with missing or imputed values for the variables needed to apply the 
sample restrictions or conduct the analyses. SBO 2007 indicates whether a franchisor had more 
than a fifty percent stake in a business, and we exclude those for which this is true. Finally, to 
restrict our analyses to sectors of activity in which franchising was a relevant option for business 
owners, we include only industries (NAICS4) in which at least three percent of businesses in our 
cleaned SBO sample were franchised (see Appendix 2.B).  
In terms of sample size, the SBO targeted 2,247,200 businesses in 2002 and 2,245,100 in 
2007 and realized response rates of 75 percent and 62 percent, respectively.36
                                                 
36 To satisfy U.S. Census Bureau disclosure procedures, all counts are rounded to hundreds. 
 Focusing on single 
unit establishments gives us 158,600 businesses in the 2002 and 96,700 businesses in the 2007, 
wave. Our data cleaning process, as noted above, has many steps. We list the most important 
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ones from the perspective of sample size reduction. Considering only observations with non-
missing and non-imputed values, specifically in ownership share, leaves us with 98,300 
businesses in the 2002 and 45,800 businesses in the 2007 wave.37
In the survival regressions, we control for the following business characteristics: legal 
form of organization (sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation), industrial sector (4-digit 
NAICS) interacted with startup size (0, 1-5, 6-20, 21-100 employees), geography (state fixed 
effects), and startup number of employees. We also control for the following business owner 
characteristics: age (younger than 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and older), gender, race 
(White, African American, Asian, Other), education (less than high school, high school, 
technical or vocational school, some college, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, postgraduate 
degree), and average weekly number of hours worked in the business (less than 20 hours, 20-39 
hours, 40 hours, 41-59 hours, 60 hours or more). We include indicators for whether the majority 
 Considering only businesses 
started in one of the years to which the SBO pertains, that is, only businesses that responded to 
the survey question, “When was the business originally established, purchased, or acquired by 
the owner(s) [..]?” with “2002” or “2007,” reduces the 2002 sample to 32,200 businesses and 
2007 sample to 18,300 businesses. Selecting only businesses that responded to the similar survey 
question, “In what year was this business originally established?” (missing in the 2002 SBO) 
with “2007” reduces the sample to 15,100 businesses. Considering only industries in which 
franchising was a relevant option for business owners (see Appendix 2.B) reduced the 2002 
sample to 15,400 and the 2007 sample to 6,000 businesses. The remaining data cleaning steps 
result in final samples of 11,582 observations for the SBO 2002 wave and 4,351 observations for 
the SBO 2007 wave. 
                                                 
37 Considering non-missing and non-imputed values for other key variables would result in similar final sample 
sizes. 
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of a business is owned by members of the same family and whether the business is operated 
primarily from a home. We control as well for the source of capital used to start the business (in 
the SBO 2002: personal/family savings, business loan from a bank or financial institution, 
personal/family assets, personal/business credit card, business loan from government, 
government guaranteed business loan, outside investor, or none needed; in the SBO 2007: 
personal/family savings, business loan from a bank or financial institution, personal/family 
assets, personal/business credit card, business loan from government, government guaranteed 
business loan, none needed, personal/family home equity loan, business loan from 
family/friends, venture capital investment, grants, other sources of capital, or do not know). We 
include the following market conditions variables for the year in which a business was started: 
log of county population, log of county per capita mean personal income, log of county 
geographic area, county fraction of males, county fraction of African Americans, county fraction 
of population other than African American or Caucasian, county fraction of population age 14 
and younger, county fraction of population age 65 and older, and county unemployment rate. We 
also control for county fraction of population age 25 and older with at least a high school degree 
or equivalent, and include indicators for central and outlying counties of the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas.  
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Appendix 2.B – List of Selected Industries 
List of NAICS4 Industries, SBO 2002 
2131 3372 4451 4853 5331 6241 
2213 3399 4452 4885 5418 6244 
2330 4200 4461 4889 5419 7112 
2340 4231 4471 4921 5511 7113 
2352 4239 4481 4922 5613 7131 
2353 4242 4482 4931 5614 7139 
2357 4243 4483 5100 5617 7211 
2359 4246 4511 5133 5619 7220 
2372 4249 4529 5151 6100 7221 
2380 4400 4532 5173 6111 7222 
2383 4411 4539 5182 6114 8111 
3113 4412 4541 5242 6115 8112 
3115 4413 4542 5300 6116 8114 
3118 4421 4543 5310 6117 8121 
3231 4422 4800 5312 6200 8123 
3272 4431 4812 5321 6215 8129 
3273 4441 4832 5322 6216   
3332 4442 4842 5323 6233   
List of NAICS4 Industries, SBO 2007 
1152 4400 4512 5241 5621 7112 
3118 4411 4532 5242 5622 7139 
3119 4412 4533 5312 5629 7211 
3149 4413 4539 5322 6114 7220 
3152 4421 4800 5331 6115 7221 
3231 4422 4853 5418 6116 7222 
3259 4431 4885 5511 6117 7223 
3261 4442 4889 5610 6200 8111 
3371 4451 4921 5613 6215 8112 
3399 4452 4922 5614 6216 8114 
4200 4461 4931 5615 6230 8121 
4231 4471 5111 5616 6233 8129 
4238 4482 5161 5617 6241   
4244 4511 5181 5619 6244   
Notes: To restrict our focus to sectors of activity in which franchising is a relevant option for 
business owners, we select only industries (NAICS4) in which at least three percent of businesses 
in our cleaned SBO sample were franchised.  
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Appendix 2.C – States with Franchise Relationship Regulation 
State Relationship Reg. State Relationship Reg. 
Alabama – Montana – 
Alaska – Nebraska Yes 
Arizona – Nevada – 
Arkansas Yes New Hampshire – 
California Yes New Jersey Yes 
Colorado – New Mexico – 
Connecticut Yes New York – 
Delaware Yes North Carolina – 
D.C. – North Dakota – 
Florida – Ohio – 
Georgia – Oklahoma – 
Hawaii Yes Oregon – 
Idaho – Pennsylvania – 
Illinois Yes Rhode Island – 
Indiana Yes South Carolina – 
Iowa Yes South Dakota – 
Kansas – Tennessee Yes 
Kentucky – Texas – 
Louisiana – Utah – 
Maine – Vermont – 
Maryland – Virginia Yes 
Massachusetts – Washington Yes 
Michigan Yes West Virginia – 
Minnesota Yes Wisconsin Yes 
Mississippi –* Wyoming – 
Missouri –* Total (States) 16 
* Because franchisors in those two states can terminate franchise agreements without good cause, 
we do not consider Mississippi and Missouri to have franchise relationship laws, although 
technically they do. Source: Information on relationship laws is from Klick, Kobayashi, and 
Ribstein (2006).  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAWS ON 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP‡
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Bankruptcy laws determine how costly it is for entrepreneurs to shut down insolvent businesses. 
As many startups do not succeed and some end up insolvent, making the consequences of 
bankruptcy less daunting may increase entrepreneurs’ willingness to start businesses. The 2005 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) made it more difficult 
for individual bankruptcy filers to take advantage of more lenient state bankruptcy laws. We 
examine the impact of bankruptcy legislation, in particular homestead exemptions, on 
entrepreneurship, measured by business entry rates.  
We focus on the homestead exemption, which protects the houses of individuals who 
default on unsecured loans, because it is the largest and most variable exemption. Our analyses 
exploit variation in these exemptions together with changes caused by the 2005 enactment of the 
BAPCPA. We use comprehensive, confidential U.S. Census Bureau databases that include the 
universe of all U.S. businesses, employer and nonemployer, namely, the Longitudinal Business 
Database (LBD) and the Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (ILBD). The U.S. Census 
                                                 
‡ This essay represents joint work with Xiaoyang Li of the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business.   
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Bureau defines a nonemployer business as a business with no paid employees, an employer 
business as a business with paid employees. We also observe the legal form of organization 
under which businesses are established, sole proprietorships, which have unlimited liability, 
being expected to be affected, corporations, which have limited liability, not to be directly 
affected, by personal bankruptcy laws. 
Lenient personal bankruptcy laws can enhance entrepreneurial activity by inducing risk-
averse individuals to become entrepreneurs (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). Fan and White 
(2003) and Armour and Cumming (2008), for example, find individuals protected by debtor-
friendly bankruptcy systems to be more likely to be business owners. Paik (2013), however, 
finds the BAPCPA to have virtually no noticeable effect on the overall level of entrepreneurship, 
in part because entrepreneurs have become more likely to start businesses as limited liability 
instead of unlimited liability companies. 
Our essay makes two main contributions to the literature. First, ours is the first essay to 
explore the impact of bankruptcy homestead exemptions on entry rates of both employer and 
nonemployer businesses. The literature on the impact of bankruptcy laws has focused on self-
employment, a small segment of the economy, and relied on survey data, such as the Survey of 
the Income and Program Participation (Fan and White, 2003) and the Current Population Survey 
(Paik, 2013). Moreover, it has examined mostly the effect of bankruptcy legislation on being 
self-employed (Fan and White, 2003, Armour and Cumming, 2008) or outcomes of already 
operating businesses (Cerqueiro and Penas, 2011). We explore instead business creation for both 
employer and nonemployer businesses, for which we are able to construct measures without 
selection issues because our data include all U.S. businesses. Our second contribution is that our 
analyses of the effects of homestead exemptions take into account state house values, which is 
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critical because they affect an entrepreneur’s possible downside in the event of bankruptcy. 
Finally, we control for various market-level characteristics that might affect the rate of business 
creation. 
We find moderate positive effects of the bankruptcy homestead exemption on entry rates 
of sole proprietorships, more pronounced for nonemployer businesses, and no significant effects 
for corporations. Entrepreneurs’ choice of legal form of organization seems not to be affected by 
homestead exemptions, nor do we find evidence of any significant effect of the BAPCPA on 
entry rates.  
The essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss bankruptcy laws, in 
Section 3.3 the theoretical framework. We describe the data in Section 3.4, and discuss our 
empirical approach and present our results in Section 3.5. Concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 3.6. 
3.2 Bankruptcy Laws 
The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code includes two bankruptcy procedures, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. 
Prior to the restrictions imposed by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, most unsecured debt was discharged under both chapters. Filing under 
Chapter 7, which required that debt be repaid only from income above an exemption level, 
offered immediate and complete relief. Debtors who filed under Chapter 13, on the other hand, 
were required to repay debt from post-bankruptcy incomes according to a court-approved plan. 
Not surprisingly, filers permitted to choose between the two mostly file under Chapter 7. 
The BAPCPA, which went into effect on October 17, 2005, overhauled the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code. Under the BAPCPA, the two bankruptcy procedures were retained, but 
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debtors’ right to choose between them was restricted. Income must now be below a cutoff level 
based on the median family income in a state to file under Chapter 7, and debtors who file under 
Chapter 13, after considering allowed exemptions and payments on secured loans, must use their 
income for five years post bankruptcy to repay their obligations. We expect a negative effect on 
the willingness of some prospective entrepreneurs to start a business, but no differential impact 
of this change across states. Our empirical approach hence does not focus on this aspect of 
BAPCPA, as any effect would be captured by year fixed effects. 
Bankruptcy legislation also specifies exemptions that enable individuals who default on 
unsecured loans, that is, loans secured only by the borrower’s creditworthiness rather than 
collateral, to protect certain assets from liquidation. There are a number of bankruptcy 
exemptions including personal property and motor vehicle exemptions. The largest and most 
variable across states, however, is that for equity in owner-occupied housing, namely, the 
homestead exemption.38
The BAPCPA capped the homestead exemption at $125,000 for debtors who acquired 
their homes within 1,215 days of filing for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy reform also made it more 
difficult to use the homestead exemption to shelter financial assets by imposing restrictions on 
both converting non-exempt assets into home equity and relocating to states with unlimited 
 Homestead exemptions range from zero (in Maryland) to unlimited (in 
Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, D.C.). A 
high homestead exemption reduces the risk of starting sole proprietorship businesses because the 
entrepreneurs, in the event the businesses fail, are less likely to lose their homes. Entrepreneurs 
who have a home mortgage may also be able to protect some non-housing assets with a 
homestead exemption by using those assets to pay down the mortgage. 
                                                 
38 We include in any mention of the U.S. states the District of Columbia (D.C.).  
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homestead exemptions before filing. These changes are expected to have a differential impact 
across states, affecting business activity the most in states with high or unlimited exemptions. 
Because the changes affect only a fraction of potential entrepreneurs, however, specifically those 
who acquired their homestead property within 1,215 days of filing for bankruptcy, the effects on 
states’ business entry rates might be small.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) build a general equilibrium model in which, more risk averse 
individuals become workers and less risk averse individuals entrepreneurs. Given that many 
startups do not succeed and some become insolvent, making the consequences of bankruptcy less 
costly should increase the number of individuals willing to start businesses.  
We focus on businesses of two legal forms of organization, sole proprietorships, the 
owners of which incur unlimited personal liability, and corporations, the owners of which incur 
only limited liability. Because of the differences in liability between these two organizational 
forms, we anticipate a differential impact of bankruptcy exemptions; sole proprietorships should 
be directly affected, corporations not affected. Based on Kihlstrom and Laffont’s (1979) 
framework, we expect to find in states in which the consequences of bankruptcy are less costly 
higher sole proprietorship entry rates and a higher percentage of businesses started as sole 
proprietorships.  
Because possible downsides of starting a business depend on the value of entrepreneurs’ 
home as well as on the homestead exemption, to better capture the costs of possible bankruptcy 
we create a measure of exposure defined as the difference between the state median house price 
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and homestead exemption, truncated at zero. States with an unlimited homestead exemption have 
an exposure of zero. 
That exposure directly affects only sole proprietors (due to their unlimited liability) leads 
to our hypothesis that higher exposure is associated with lower levels of entrepreneurship, 
measured by entry rates. If entrepreneurs in higher exposure states are more likely to start 
businesses as corporations, entry rates for corporations should be higher, and for sole 
proprietorships lower, in such states. The percentage of businesses started as sole proprietorships 
should also be lower in such states. Expecting, based on industry dynamics models going back to 
Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), that in long-run equilibrium entry and exit rates will be 
similarly affected, we analyze as well whether higher exposure is associated with lower business 
exit rates for sole proprietors. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Bankruptcy Regulation 
Our period of analysis, 2000-2009, spans several years before and after the 2005 BAPCPA 
reform. Table 3.1 reports states’ mean homestead exemptions over this period. We measure 
home values using state-year data on median house prices (also reported in Table 3.1) from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (Leventis, 2010).39
                                                 
39 Our analyses being conducted at an annual level, we calculate an arithmetic mean of quarterly median house 
prices to obtain an annual median house price. 
 As noted above, the exposure variable is 
defined as the difference between the state median house price and homestead exemption. Not 
being permitted to be negative, this measure is equal to zero in states in which the homestead 
exemption is unlimited. Mean exposure, as can be seen in Table 3.2, is $107,603 (2010 $). We 
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create a binary variable equal to one for states with unlimited homestead exemption, as these 
states might be different from other states with zero exposure. 
3.4.2 Dependent Variables 
Relative to publicly available data sources like the County Business Patterns or Nonemployer 
Statistics, the confidential U.S. Census Bureau databases on which we rely, the Longitudinal 
Business Database (LBD) and Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (ILBD), include 
detailed information about businesses as well as unique identifiers that enable us to track them 
over time. The LBD provides annual information on the geographic location and legal form of 
organization of all private sector employer establishments, the ILBD annual information on the 
location and legal form of organization of all nonemployer businesses, in the United States.40
Entrants are defined as nonemployer businesses operating in the market during the 
current period that were not present in the market in the previous period. We define the 
nonemployer sole proprietorship entry rate at the state-year level as the number of entering 
nonemployer sole proprietorships in year t divided by the number of nonemployer sole 
proprietorships in year t-1. Table 3.2 shows the mean entry rate of nonemployer sole 
proprietorship businesses to be 32.4 percent. To analyze whether entrepreneurs’ choice of legal 
form of organization is strategic, we define nonemployer entrants that are sole proprietorships as 
a percentage of nonemployer entrants that are sole proprietorships or corporations. The mean is 
94.9 percent. We define exiters as nonemployer businesses operating in the market during the 
current period that are no longer present in the following period. The exit rate of nonemployer 
sole proprietorships is defined as the number of exiting nonemployer sole proprietorships in year 
  
                                                 
40 Information on construction of the LBD can be found in Jarmin and Miranda (2002). The ILBD, described by 
Davis et al. (2007), draws on information from individual and corporate tax returns and various business surveys 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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t divided by the number of nonemployer sole proprietorships in year t. The sample mean is 29.2 
percent. The measures are defined similarly for corporations. In the same way, we construct 
entry and exit rates (both sole proprietorships and corporations), and percentage of entering sole 
proprietorships, for employer business establishments. Table 3.2 lists our ten dependent variables 
of interest. Our analyses draw on data from 1999 to 2010, the first year being used to define 
entry rates and the last year being used to define exit rates. Our sample thus spans a ten-year 
period from 2000 to 2009. 
The U.S. Census Bureau’s Nonemployer Statistics data for 2009 identify 86.2 percent 
and 6.6 percent of 21,695,828 nonemployer businesses as sole proprietorships and corporations, 
respectively. Although nonemployer businesses are more abundant, the vast majority of 
economic activity comes from employer businesses, which generated 97 percent of revenues in 
the United States in 2007.41
3.5 Econometric Specifications and Results 
 The County Business Patterns data, also compiled by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, show that the most prevalent legal form of organization in the employer universe 
is corporation. Of 7,433,465 employer establishments, 68.8 percent were corporations and only 
13.3 percent sole proprietorships. 
We identify the effects of personal bankruptcy laws in terms of variation in entrepreneurs’ 
exposure levels across states and time by estimating the following specification, 
𝑌𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼1𝐸𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷_𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷_𝑢𝑛2005𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑟 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 
where the s subscript indexes states, the r subscript geographical regions within the United States 
(namely, Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), and the t subscript years. Our analyses cover 50 
                                                 
41 See https://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html. 
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states and Washington, D.C. over the period 2000-2009. Yst is the outcome variable, being entry 
or exit rate of a particular type or percentage of nonemployer or employer entrants that are sole 
proprietorships. The main independent variable of interest is entrepreneurs’ exposure (Est), which 
is measured at the state-year level in hundreds of thousands of 2010 dollars. As states with an 
unlimited homestead exemption might be different from other states with zero exposure, our 
specification includes a binary variable D_unst that indicates observations with unlimited 
homestead exemption. To analyze whether the 2005 BAPCPA affected outcomes of interest in 
states with the most generous exemptions, in which the effect is expected to be the most 
pronounced, we include as an indicator for states with unlimited exemptions in the post-2005 
years the variable D_un2005st. 
The vector of market-level control variables (Xcst) includes the state-year log of median 
house price, log of population, log of per capita personal income, and county demographics, 
specifically, gender, race, and age compositions of the population.42
                                                 
42 Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Asplund and Nocke (2006) show market size to increase competition 
intensity and industry turnover, which is why we include proxies for market size as control variables in our 
specifications. 
 These data are from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, State Population Estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau, and 
Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on state-level yearly 
unemployment rates are from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). Geographic areas of states, which may affect the intensity of competition and 
are entered in log form, are from the U.S. Census Bureau State and County QuickFacts. To 
account for the possibility that states with more stringent bankruptcy exemption laws may have 
also adopted other business regulations that might affect our analyses, we include the Small 
Business Survival Index (SBSI) for the year 2000. Produced by the Small Business & 
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Entrepreneurship Council (Keating, 2000), the index is designed to reflect major state-level costs 
imposed on businesses, the greater its value, the greater the costs. The index ranges from 24.9 
(South Dakota) to 68.2 (Washington, D.C.). For the same reason, we include an indicator for 
right-to-work states. We also include year fixed effects to account for common unobserved 
factors within years, such as effects of macroeconomic fluctuations, and Census region fixed 
effects to account for unobserved geographic differences across regions.43
Results in Table 3.3 show there to be a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between sole proprietorship entry rates and level of exposure. Column 1 shows a hundred 
thousand dollar increase in exposure to be associated with a 0.77 percentage point reduction in 
the entry rate of nonemployer sole proprietorships. The coefficient for employer sole 
proprietorships (column 3) is also negative and significant at -0.54 percentage points. The 
coefficients for corporations (columns 2 and 4), which should not be negatively affected by 
exposure, given their limited liability, are not statistically significant.  
 The fixed effects are 
denoted ηt and δr. Because the outcomes of interest may be correlated within a state over time, 
standard errors εst are clustered at the state level. 
Although relative to the 32.4 percent mean state entry rate of nonemployer sole 
proprietorships (see Table 3.2), and mean exposure level of 107,603 (2010 $), the effects might 
not seem large, because bankruptcy regulation directly affects millions of businesses even small 
differences in entry rate can translate into large effects in the economy.44
                                                 
43 Although the effects of bankruptcy laws can be identified even with state fixed effects, because limited variation 
in the exposure variable Est precludes precise estimation of the effect, we include instead region fixed effects 
together with an extensive set of control variables.  
 For instance, a one 
standard deviation increase in entrepreneurs’ exposure is estimated to lead to a 0.75 percentage 
44 The U.S. Census Bureau reports there being 18,701,855 nonemployer (Nonemployer Statistics) and 987,858 
employer (County Business Patterns) sole proprietorships in 2009.  
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point reduction in entry rate of nonemployer sole proprietorships and 0.53 percentage point 
reduction in entry rate of employer sole proprietorships.45
We also analyze changes brought about by the federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 
by focusing on the indicator for states with unlimited exemption in post-2005 years. As can be 
seen from the third row in Table 3.3, even in the states with the most generous homestead 
exemptions, in which the effect of the BAPCPA should be most pronounced, we do not find any 
significant negative effects. 
 For 2009, this would translate into 
139,547 fewer nonemployer, and 5,205 fewer employer, sole proprietorship establishments 
having been started. 
Table 3.4 shows the absence of statistically significant results of exposure on choice of 
legal form of organization. If entrepreneurs’ decision to start a business as a corporation in 
higher exposure states is strategic, we should observe higher entry rates for corporations in such 
states. Lack of significant results in Table 3.4 suggest this is not the case. These findings are in 
line with the lack of positive effects of exposure on entry rates of corporations reported in 
Table 3.3; if entrepreneurs were more likely to incorporate businesses as a result of higher 
exposure, higher entry rates for corporations would be expected in such states, which, again, is 
not the case. 
Theory predicts exit and entry rates to be the same in long-run equilibrium. To check 
whether the effect of entrepreneurs’ exposure on entry rates is reflected in business exit rates, we 
run the same specifications using exit rate as the dependent variable. Table 3.5 shows the effect 
                                                 
45 The 0.75, rounded to two decimal digits, is derived by multiplying the estimated coefficient of 0.769 by one 
standard deviation in the exposure (which, from Table 3.2, is 0.97031), the 0.53, rounded to two decimal digits, by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient of 0.543 by one standard deviation in the exposure (which, again from 
Table 3.2, is 0.97031).  
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of entrepreneurs’ exposure to be negative and significant (albeit somewhat smaller than the 
estimates for entry rates) for sole proprietorships (columns 1 and 3), and not significant for 
corporations (columns 2 and 4).  
3.6 Conclusion 
This essay provides empirical evidence on the effect of personal bankruptcy laws on 
entrepreneurship, measured by business entry rates. We find the effect of the bankruptcy 
homestead exemptions on entry rates to be positive for businesses operated as sole 
proprietorships and not significant for corporations. Entrepreneurs’ choice of legal form of 
organization does not seem to be affected by homestead exemptions and we find no evidence of 
a significant effect of the BAPCPA on entry rates when we focus on states in which the 
homestead exemption is unlimited. 
Although relative to mean entry rates, the estimated effects of homestead exemptions on 
entry rates might not seem large, considering the number of affected business in the economy, 
the effects are significant. Follow-up research focusing on businesses within particular industrial 
sectors might uncover effects of substantially larger magnitudes.  
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Table 3.1 – Mean Homestead Exemptions and House Prices 
State Exemption House Price State Exemption House Price 
Alabama 11,328 132,151 Montana 279,830 163,014 
Alaska 75,336 223,864 Nebraska 28,794 122,791 
Arizona 145,448 198,196 Nevada 292,872 236,670 
Arkansas Unlimited 113,803 New Hampshire 167,624 240,810 
California 84,961 409,297 New Jersey 41,553 309,973 
Colorado 100,548 232,745 New Mexico 86,454 160,973 
Connecticut 169,921 290,747 New York 55,956 251,627 
Delaware 20,812 228,297 North Carolina 29,732 159,149 
D.C. Unlimited* 336,264 North Dakota 90,625 112,624 
Florida Unlimited 190,727 Ohio 17,497 132,649 
Georgia 20,159 160,761 Oklahoma Unlimited 109,620 
Hawaii 41,553 475,031 Oregon 41,187 216,521 
Idaho 72,045 150,296 Pennsylvania 41,553 153,285 
Illinois 21,613 182,885 Rhode Island 214,631 261,246 
Indiana 23,236 122,697 South Carolina 48,791 146,755 
Iowa Unlimited 118,858 South Dakota Unlimited 143,194 
Kansas Unlimited 120,865 Tennessee 8,496 124,545 
Kentucky 11,328 134,240 Texas Unlimited 132,744 
Louisiana 28,320 139,529 Utah 45,312 193,662 
Maine 70,706 177,763 Vermont 169,921 204,642 
Maryland 0 273,401 Virginia 12,461 237,000 
Massachusetts 418,559 329,680 Washington 71,500 255,534 
Michigan 41,553 145,773 West Virginia 51,645 115,217 
Minnesota 257,370 192,424 Wisconsin 45,312 165,592 
Mississippi 169,921 119,644 Wyoming 22,656 165,666 
Missouri 13,566 132,618 Mean 84,682** 193,099 
Notes: The values reported are means for 2000-2009, the years used in the analyses. All values are 
in 2010 dollars. The homestead exemptions are based on searches of individual states statutes 
supplemented by information on exemptions from Elias et al. (2005), Cerqueiro and Penas (2011), 
and Corradin et al. (2013). * D.C. has unlimited homestead exemption only from year 2005. ** 
The mean is calculated over observations with limited homestead exemption. Median house prices 
are provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (Leventis, 2010).   
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Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables Mean  SD 
Entry Rate (%) – Sole Proprietorships, Nonemployers 32.42 6.35 
Entry Rate (%) – Corporations, Nonemployers 32.49 6.41 
Entry Rate (%) – Sole Proprietorships, Employers 15.81 7.64 
Entry Rate (%) – Corporations, Employers 10.58 2.70 
Percentage of Entrants that are Sole Proprietorships, Nonemployers (%) 94.94 2.40 
Percentage of Entrants that are Sole Proprietorships, Employers (%) 33.22 2.12 
Exit Rate (%) – Sole Proprietorships, Nonemployers 29.16 4.01 
Exit Rate (%) – Corporations, Nonemployers 33.48 4.96 
Exit Rate (%) – Sole Proprietorships, Employers 16.47 2.54 
Exit Rate (%) – Corporations, Employers 9.71 1.58 
Regulation Variables Mean  SD 
Exposure* (2010 $) 107,603 97,031 
Indicator – Unlimited Homestead Exemption States 0.1471 0.3545 
Indicator – Unlimited Homestead Exemption States Post-2005 0.0627 0.2427 
Other Market-Level Variables Mean  SD 
Median House Price** (2010 $) 193,099 85,468 
Population** 5,771,888 6,430,736 
Population: Mean Personal Income** (2010 $) 38,580 6,504 
Population: Males (%) 49.23 0.79 
Population: Caucasians (%) 81.13 13.65 
Population: African Americans (%) 11.33 11.41 
Population: Other Race (%) 7.54 10.14 
Population: Age 14 and Younger (%) 20.34 1.71 
Population: Age 15-65 (%) 66.99 1.44 
Population: Age 65 and Older (%) 12.67 1.73 
Population: Unemployed (%) 5.19 1.67 
Geographic Area** (Square Miles) 138,723 169,871 
SBSI 42.52 8.66 
Indicator – Right-to-Work States 0.43 0.50 
Number of Observations 510 
Period 2000-2009 
Notes: Observations are at the state-year level (50 states and D.C. times 10 years). Geographic 
Area, SBSI index, and Indicator for Right-to-Work States vary only across states. The index is 
designed to take into account major state-level costs imposed on businesses; the greater the value, 
the greater the costs. In the sample, the index ranges from 24.9 (South Dakota) to 68.2 (D.C.). * 
Exposure is defined as state median house price in a given year minus the homestead exemption 
(the measure can only be non-negative; states with unlimited homestead exemption have an 
exposure of zero). ** Median house price, population, personal income per capita, and geographic 
area are entered into the regressions in logs.  
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Table 3.3 – Entry Rates 
  Nonemployers Entry Rate (%) Employers Entry Rate (%) 
 Sole Prop. Corporations Sole Prop. Corporations 
Exposure (in $100,000) -0.769** -0.762 -0.543** -0.259 
  (0.372) (0.588) (0.229) (0.233) 
Indicator for States with 
Unlimited Exemption 
0.155 1.461 0.379 1.079* 
(0.726) (1.535) (0.622) (0.636) 
Indicator for States with 
Unlimited Exemption in 
Post-2005 Years 
-0.098 -1.576 -0.260 -0.490 
(0.362) (1.240) (0.522) (0.391) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 510 510 510 510 
Period 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the state-year level. All regressions include the 
following set of controls: log of median house price, log of population, log of per capita mean 
personal income, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other 
than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of 
population age 65 and older, unemployment rate, log of geographic area, SBSI index, and 
indicator for Right-to-Work states.  
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Table 3.4 – Percentage of Entrants that are Sole Proprietorships 
  Percentage of Nonemployer 
Entrants that are Sole 
Proprietorships (%) 
Percentage of Employer 
Entrants that are Sole 
Proprietorships (%) 
  
  
Exposure (in $100,000) 0.251 0.825 
  (0.285) (1.560) 
Indicator for States with Unlimited 
Exemption 
-0.017 -1.310 
(0.781) (4.090) 
Indicator for States with Unlimited 
Exemption in Post-2005 Years 
-0.070 1.420 
(0.273) (1.260) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Region Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 510 510 
Period 2000-2009 2000-2009 
Notes: The percentage of the dependent variable is of the entrants that are sole proprietorships or 
corporations of nonemployer (column 1) or employer (column 2) type. Standard errors are 
clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Observations are at the state-year level. All regressions include the following set of controls: log of 
median house price, log of population, log of per capita mean personal income, fraction of males, 
fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other than African American or Caucasian, 
fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of population age 65 and older, unemployment 
rate, log of geographic area, SBSI index, and indicator for Right-to-Work states.   
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Table 3.5 – Exit Rates 
  Nonemployers Exit Rate (%) Employers Exit Rate (%) 
  Sole Prop. Corporations Sole Prop. Corporations 
Exposure (in $100,000) -0.531* -0.215 -0.467** -0.213 
 (0.280) (0.244) (0.221) (0.210) 
Indicator for States with 
Unlimited Exemption 
0.365 0.114 0.671 0.131 
(0.551) (0.629) (0.574) (0.378) 
Indicator for States with 
Unlimited Exemption in 
Post-2005 Years 
-0.195 0.0499 -0.505* -0.262 
(0.309) (0.374) (0.275) (0.320) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects – Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 510 510 510 510 
Period 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Observations are at the state-year level. All regressions include the 
following set of controls: log of median house price, log of population, log of per capita mean 
personal income, fraction of males, fraction of African Americans, fraction of population other 
than African American or Caucasian, fraction of population age 14 and younger, fraction of 
population age 65 and older, unemployment rate, log of geographic area, SBSI index, and 
indicator for Right-to-Work states. 
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